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ABSTRACT
When the military forces of the Third Reich invaded the Soviet Union in June
1941, the German authorities used local anti-Communist collaborators to facilitate the
invasion and the occupation of the conquered territories. Many of these Byelorussian
collaborators became complicit in the perpetration of the Holocaust and eagerly created a
puppet regime under the direct control of the Schutzstaffel (SS). However, this regime
and the crimes of its members remain largely unknown.
As the Third Reich crumbled, the members of the SS-sponsored Byelorussian
Central Council (BCC) hid themselves in the confusion of postwar Europe’s Displaced
Persons camps, where they began to forge relationships with the intelligence agencies of
the western Allies. As the mistrust between the Soviet Union and its erstwhile allies
grew, these Nazi collaborators represented themselves as anti-Communist refugees from
Stalinist persecution. They successfully navigated the currents of the early Cold War,
evading arrest and prosecution for their wartime crimes with the help of their new
sponsors in American intelligence. Many of the most notorious members of the BCC
immigrated to the United States and became naturalized citizens, trading the vestiges of
the Third Reich’s Byelorussian intelligence networks and military forces to American
intelligence in exchange for protection from extradition and prosecution.
This thesis is the first scholarly work to focus on the members of the BCC, the
extent of their criminal collaboration with the Third Reich, and the role American
intelligence played in helping these Byelorussian Nazi collaborators escape justice and
become United States citizens.
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INTRODUCTION & HISTORIOGRAPHY

On a hilltop behind Saint Euphrosynia Orthodox Church in the small community
of South River, New Jersey, a large memorial adorned with the official seal of the
Byelorussian Central Council (Byelorusskaya Tsentral’naja Rada, or BCC) reads, “glory
to those who fought for freedom and independence of Byelorussia.”1 This tall red and
white concrete and stone memorial is topped by a large iron cross, which has a small
double-barred cross at its center. In the original parish cemetery a few blocks away, the
tall black tombstone of Radoslaw Ostrowski proudly boasts of his achievements as
“President of Byelorussian Central Council of the Byelorussian Democratic Republic and
Founder of Byelorussian Armed Forces.”2 These prominent memorials a short distance
from the New Jersey Turnpike may be the only public monuments to Nazi collaborators
on United States soil. The Byelorussian Central Council was, in fact, a puppet regime
created by the Schutzstaffel (SS) in German-occupied Minsk in December 1943. The
Byelorussian police and military forces recruited and organized by the BCC eventually
became the 30th Waffen-Grenadier Division der SS, whose soldiers wore a red and white
machine-woven armshield on their uniforms; the double-barred cross atop the red and
white monument is the division’s insignia, which was depicted both on the armshield and

1

Thomas O’Toole, “The Secret Under the Little Cemetery: Under the Stones, the Secrets
of the White Ruthenian Cemetery,” The Washington Post (May 23, 1982), A1.
2
“Photograph and Biography of Radoslaw Ostrowski on His Gravestone in South River,
NJ,” in John Loftus, America’s Nazi Secret: An Insider’s History of How the United States
Department of Justice Obstructed Congress by: Blocking Congressional Investigations into
Famous American Families Who Funded Hitler, Stalin and Arab Terrorists: Lying to Congress,
the GAO and the CIA about the Postwar Immigration of Eastern European Nazi War Criminals
to the US: And Concealing from the 9/11 Investigations the Role of the Arab Nazi War Criminals
in Recruiting Modern Middle Eastern Terrorist Groups (Walterville, OR: TrineDay, 2010), 72.
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the collar patch worn by these soldiers of the Third Reich.3 These Byelorussian Nazi
collaborators participated in many of the most brutal crimes of the Third Reich.
Byelorussian territories were split between Poland and the Soviet Union in the
years before the Second World War, and many resentful Byelorussian nationalists found
themselves sympathetic to the anti-Polish and anti-Communist ideology of National
Socialism. Located squarely on the route from Berlin to Moscow, the territories of
Byelorussia were also of great interest to the authorities of the Third Reich as they
prepared for war to the East. Pinning their hopes for the liberation of their homeland from
Polish and Soviet hegemony on the aggressive expansionism of Germany’s leadership,
these activists eagerly pursued relationships with German authorities in anticipation of
war. They organized Byelorussian émigré communities in Poland and Germany before
the outbreak of war, they recruited paratroopers for sabotage missions against the Soviet
Union in preparation for Operation Barbarossa, and they guided the forces of the Third
Reich into the territories of their homeland. During the German invasion and occupation,
these collaborators served with the mobile killing units of the Einsatzgruppen
(operational groups) and became the German authorities’ translators, burgomasters,
policemen, and soldiers.
When the Red Army forced the Wehrmacht to retreat from Byelorussian territory
in 1944, these collaborators fled with their sponsors and attempted to portray themselves
as a legitimate government-in-exile in Berlin before disappearing into the chaos of
postwar Europe’s Displaced Persons (DP) camp network. Guilty of a multitude of crimes
on Byelorussian soil, they were desperate to avoid capture and prosecution by Soviet
3

Gordon Williamson, The Waffen-SS: 24-38. Divisions & Volunteer Legions (Oxford:
Osprey Publishing, 2004), 21.
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authorities. Five years after the end of the Second World War, many of the members of
the BCC had already escaped the Soviet authorities by immigrating to the United States.
Wanted in the Soviet Union as war criminals for their roles in atrocities during the
German occupation, they were protected and sponsored after the war by the intelligence
agencies of the western Allies. Many of the most infamous members of the BCC settled
in New Jersey, where they produced voluminous amounts of propaganda innocently
depicting their cadre as dedicated, anti-Communist Byelorussian nationalists. They
dismissed any allegation that they had collaborated with the SS as Communist
propaganda or attributed it to the jealous factionalism within the Byelorussian diaspora.
For decades, officials at the highest levels of American intelligence lied and withheld
evidence in order to protect them from extradition and prosecution. These war criminals,
brought here in direct violation of national and international law, exacerbated the tensions
of the Cold War without providing any reliable intelligence or military benefits to the
United States. Instead, harboring these collaborators tarnished the reputation and wartime
legacy of the United States and added extreme right-wing, antisemitic Nazi collaborators
to the body politic.
This examination of the members of the Byelorussian Central Council will reveal
their eager and enthusiastic collaboration with the Third Reich, their complicity in the
perpetration of the Holocaust, and their subsequent illegal emigration to the United States
under the auspices of American intelligence. Utilizing many untapped documents from
the files of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), this study tells the story of the BCC by
focusing on the careers of several of its most infamous members, from their first contacts
3

with the Third Reich to their emigration to the United States.4 The men selected for this
study were the most influential and notorious members of the Byelorussian Central
Council and serve as representative illustrations of the various roles played by elite
collaborators throughout the occupation of Byelorussia. As local guides and informants
for the Wehrmacht and the infamous Einsatzgruppen, men such as the elegant former
deputy to the Polish Sejm, Radoslaw Ostrowski, organized local auxiliary police forces
and facilitated the mass murder of countless Jews, Poles, and other racial and political
victims of the Third Reich. Appointed to serve as the German occupation’s local
officials, men such as the scholar of Slavic philology, Stanislaw Stankievich, ordered the
executions of thousands of their Jewish neighbors. Men like Emanuel Max Jasiuk worked
for the German Sicherheitsdienst (Security Service, or SD), submitted lists of persons to
be executed, and developed reputations for cruelty and sadism.5 Leaders of the occupied
land’s police and nascent national guard such as Francizek Kushel, a former officer of the
Polish army, placed local auxiliary police and military forces at the disposal of the SS,
greatly relieving the rising demands of manpower faced by the Third Reich as the tide of
war turned. The creation of the Byelorussian Central Council in December 1943 marked
the culmination of years of collaboration, although the BCC barely spent six months on
Byelorussian soil before retreating with the German forces in the face of the advancing
Red Army in June 1944.

4

These files are now available to researchers as a result of the efforts of the Interagency
Working Group established by the Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act of 1998.
http://www.archives.gov/about/laws/nazi-war-crimes.html.
5
Leroy L. Dubois, “Agent Report: September 19, 1950,” College Park, MD: National
Archives and Records Administration (hereafter NARA), RG 319, Investigative Records
Repository Files (hereafter IRR), Jasiuk, Emanuel, E 134, B 339.
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As the Third Reich crumbled, members of the BCC vanished into the confusion of
postwar Europe’s system of Displaced Persons (DP) camps. Soon they gained positions
of trust and authority within these camps, and the Byelorussian Nazi collaborators began
to reorganize themselves. They found that the growing tensions of the Cold War had
caused the western Allies to become interested in eastern European refugees who might
be capable of establishing intelligence or guerrilla networks behind the Iron Curtain in
the event of a future war with the Soviet Union. The members of the BCC, terrified of
being prosecuted in the USSR for their crimes, seized the opportunity to forge a
collaborative relationship with American intelligence, selling their services as a potential
fifth column in exchange for money, residency, and citizenship in the United States. A
few years after the end of the Second World War, most of the top leaders of the BCC
were living comfortably in the US. The Byelorussian collaborators undoubtedly received
the best of this arrangement, for they had exaggerated their resources and their support
behind the Iron Curtain as well as their following among the Byelorussian diaspora.
Worse still for American intelligence, these new resources in the covert struggle against
Communism had been heavily infiltrated by double agents. The intelligence they
produced proved to be useless, and the paramilitary guerrilla operations they attempted
ended in disaster.
By the 1970s, the clandestine espionage activities of the BCC had abated and its
members had settled into their new lives in America. In 1972, however, members of
Congress began calling for investigations into allegations that suspected Nazi war
criminals had been hiding in the United States. In 1979, this agitation resulted in the
creation of the Office of Special Investigations (OSI) within the Justice Department, a
5

bureau devoted to building cases for the deportation and extradition of such figures. In
May 1982, newspaper headlines across the US reported that the government had been
aware of the presence of these war criminals, and had even recruited hundreds of Nazi
collaborators for clandestine operations in the Cold War. John Loftus, a retired OSI
prosecutor who had been in charge of the Byelorussian cases, published a sensationalistic
book on the subject and exposed the scandal on prime-time television.6 In spite of this
significant media attention and the extensive official investigations, none of the
Byelorussian collaborators living in the United States ever answered for their crimes in a
court of law.
Nor have they been the subjects of much scholarly research. While the Second
World War, the Holocaust, and the Cold War have all been extensively studied, Englishlanguage scholarship concerning wartime collaboration in Byelorussia is still emerging.
This thesis is the first academic work to focus on the wartime crimes, postwar emigration,
and Cold War intrigues of the members of the Byelorussian Central Council. It builds
upon several more synthetic works that have emerged in recent years. Leonid Rein’s
2011 monograph, The Kings and the Pawns, is a reliable and thoroughly-researched work
that focuses upon many different aspects of collaboration in Byelorussia.7 Rein writes in
response to a monolithic Soviet historiography, which generally asserts that the peoples
of the Soviet Union rose as one against the fascist invaders. The Kings and the Pawns
focuses upon the years of the German occupation, revealing that local collaborators
shaped many facets of life during the invasion and occupation of Byelorussia, including

6

John Loftus, The Belarus Secret, ed. Nathan Miller (New York: Knopf, 1982).
Leonid Rein, The Kings and the Pawns: Collaboration in Byelorussia during World
War II (New York: Berghahn Books, 2011).
7
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politics, propaganda, religion, and police and military affairs. Rein also firmly establishes
local collusion in the perpetration of anti-Jewish persecution and mass murder. Martin
Dean’s 2000 work, Collaboration in the Holocaust, also focuses upon the role of local
collaborators in the occupation of Byelorussia and Ukraine.8 Unlike Rein, Dean relies
heavily upon eyewitness descriptions of atrocities in order to focus more narrowly upon
the crimes of the local police in the perpetration of the Holocaust. Another important
source used in this project is Hitler’s White Russians, a 2003 monograph by Antonio J.
Munoz and Oleg V. Romanko.9 Munoz and Romanko focus on the collaboration of local
police and military forces in Byelorussia, but they also include valuable information on
the political collaborators studied in this thesis. Unfortunately, none of this scholarship
focuses intently upon the elite collaborators responsible for providing Byelorussian police
and military resources to the authorities of the Third Reich, and none of these scholars
concern themselves with the postwar intrigues of the members of the BCC. The only
books that directly address the crimes and subsequent emigration of these collaborators
are John Loftus’s The Belarus Secret and its expanded 2010 edition, America’s Nazi
Secret, which contain unsubstantiated conspiracy theories and much unverifiable
information.10
Other scholarship focusing on the German occupation of Byelorussia or the Cold
War provides the necessary context to understand these events. Alexander Dallin’s
classic 1957 work, German Rule in Russia, contains useful background information on
8

Martin Dean, Collaboration in the Holocaust: Crimes of the Local Police in Belorussia
and Ukraine, 1941-44 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000).
9
Antonio J. Munoz and Oleg V. Romanko, Hitler’s White Russians: Collaboration,
Extermination, and Anti-Partisan Warfare in Byelorussia, 1941-1944 (Bayside, NY: Europa
Books, 2003).
10
John Loftus, The Belarus Secret; idem, America’s Nazi Secret.
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German policies and practices in the occupied territories of the East, and recent works by
authors such as Waitman Wade Beorn, Wendy Lower, and Timothy Snyder help to
illuminate the devastation wrought by the brutal German occupation.11 In addition to the
English-language scholarship addressed above, German-language studies, such as
Bernhard Chiari’s Alltag hinter der Front and Christian Gerlach’s Kalkulierte Morde,
have also contributed to the development of this area of Holocaust studies in recent
years.12 Studies on intelligence operations in the postwar era, such as Christopher
Simpson’s 1988 Blowback and Eric Lichtblau’s recent The Nazis Next Door, reveal that
American intelligence protected Byelorussian, Latvian, Lithuanian, and Ukrainian Nazi
collaborators.13 Hitler’s Shadow, a recent publication by Richard Breitman and Norman
J.W. Goda, also illuminates this phenomenon by revealing the relationships forged
between American intelligence agencies, German war criminals, and Ukrainian Nazi
collaborators after the war.14
Because there is still relatively little scholarship on the members of the BCC, this
study relies heavily upon primary source materials. These include memoirs written in
English for western audiences during the Cold War, although it is worth noting that
11

Waitman Wade Beorn, Marching into Darkness: The Wehrmacht and the Holocaust in
Belarus (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2014; Alexander Dallin, German Rule in
Russia, 1941-1945: A Study of Occupation Policies (London: MacMillan and Company Limited,
1957); Wendy Lower, Nazi Empire-Building and the Holocaust in Ukraine (Chapel Hill, NC: The
University of North Carolina Press, 2005); Timothy Snyder, Bloodlands: Europe Between Hitler
and Stalin (New York: Basic Books, 2010).
12
Bernhard Chiari, Alltag hinter der Front: Besatzung, Kollaboration und Widerstand in
Weissrussland 1941-1944 (Düsseldorf: Droste Verlag, 1998; Christian Gerlach, Kalkulierte
Morde: Die deutsche Wirtschafts- und Vernichtungspolitik in Weissrussland 1941 bis 1944
(Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 2000).
13
Eric Lichtblau, The Nazis Next Door: How America Became a Safe Haven for Hitler’s
Men (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2014); Christopher Simpson, Blowback: America’s
Recruitment of Nazis and Its Effect on the Cold War (New York: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1988).
14
Richard Breitman and Norman J.W. Goda, Hitler’s Shadow: Nazi War Criminals, U.S.
Intelligence, and the Cold War (College Park, MD: National Archives, 2011).
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autobiographical accounts intended for public consumption must be handled with great
care, for they often reflect the self-interest of the authors. This is especially problematic
when using the memoirs of accused war criminals, whose accurate biographies could be
used to incriminate them. The majority of the primary sources cited below are documents
and memoranda from the files of the CIA, the FBI, and the INS at the National Archives
and Records Administration in College Park, Maryland. These largely untapped sources
not only reveal the crimes committed by the members of the Byelorussian Central
Council during the Second World War, but also the extensive ties they forged with the
intelligence agencies of the United States during the early Cold War.
The first part of this thesis provides necessary context and reveals how the future
members of the Byelorussian Central Council first began their relationships with
representatives of the Third Reich in German-occupied Poland. Part Two focuses on the
period from summer 1941 to autumn 1943, beginning with the German invasion of the
Soviet Union and ending with a change in the German leadership of occupied
Byelorussia that provided the Byelorussian collaborators with an opportunity to expand
their influence and prestige. The third part explains the foundation of the Byelorussian
Central Council and its actions during the six-month period in which the council existed
on Byelorussian soil. Part Four of the thesis focuses on the fall of the Third Reich and the
immediate postwar period, when members of the BCC fled to Berlin before disappearing
into DP camps, where they first began forging relationships with American intelligence
operatives. The fifth and final part of this study reveals how several members of the BCC
evaded justice by immigrating to the United States, eventually becoming naturalized
citizens.
9

Several government agencies in the United States were aware of the presence of
these men for decades, and multiple agencies sponsored and protected them. Culpability
for harboring wanted war criminals in the United States extended to the top levels of
American intelligence. This study is among the first academic works to tell the story of
America’s Byelorussian Nazi collaborators, revealing the extent of their wartime crimes
as well as the postwar relationship they forged with American intelligence during the
heightened tensions of the Cold War.
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PART 1
WILLING TO “WORK WITH THE DEVIL HIMSELF”:
BYELORUSSIAN NATIONALIST EMIGRES, 1919-1941
Modern Belarus has been an independent state only since the disintegration of the
Soviet Union in 1991, but the Byelorussians have long been a people torn culturally
between their powerful neighbors and divided politically by the machinations of foreign
armies and governments. The geographic border separating interwar Poland from the
Soviet Union ran approximately north to south along a line to the west of Minsk, dividing
Byelorussian lands into two comparable areas, each composed of five oblasts (regions).
The western oblasts became known as the Polish kresy (borderlands). The region also
was divided by ethnic and religious differences, for the population of the Byelorussian
territories in the early twentieth century was comprised of a wide variety of peoples,
including those who identified themselves as Byelorussians, Poles, Russians, Ukrainians,
Latvians, Lithuanians, Jews, and Tatars. Most Christians who identified more closely
with Russia practiced the Russian Orthodox faith, while most who identified more
closely with Poland were Roman Catholic. Located in the heart of the Pale of Settlement,
Byelorussian territories had been home to one of the largest population of Jews in Europe
for centuries, and though many craftsmen and traders from the shtetls (rural Jewish
villages) enjoyed good working relationships with their gentile neighbors, antisemitic
prejudices abounded.
At the outbreak of the Second World War, many Byelorussian nationalists saw
Nazi Germany as a natural ally against the many perceived threats posed by these nonByelorussian ethnic, national, or religious groups. The first seeds of this relationship were
11

cultivated by Byelorussian political refugees from the Soviet Union who came into
contact with German representatives in interwar Poland. The Byelorussians began to
organize themselves, seeing a vehicle for their own eventual independent statehood in the
aggressive expansion of the Third Reich. As German preparations for the invasion of the
Soviet Union progressed, these relationships developed into plans for the subversion of
Soviet forces by parachuting in Byelorussian recruits to conduct guerrilla action and
sabotage behind Red Army lines. Under the subsequent German occupation of
Byelorussia, these collaborators became integral to the implementation of brutal German
policies and rose to prominent positions of authority. In order to understand how and why
these men came to collaborate with Nazi Germany, it is necessary to begin with the
context in which their relationship with the Third Reich developed.
In the final turbulent decades of Romanov rule, many national minorities in the
Russian Empire strongly asserted their own cultures, languages, and identities. A unique
Byelorussian national identity had been developing since the late 1800s. In the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries, Byelorussian territories were all within the borders of the
Russian Empire, comprising the westernmost lands of the czars’ kingdom. The
propagation of Byelorussian-language literature in the early 1900s helped a sense of
cultural nationalism to flourish despite Russian political hegemony and mid-nineteenth
century efforts at cultural assimilation. Byelorussia’s elite were among the most
successfully Russified of the empire’s national minorities, but many young Byelorussians
were still hopeful that the disintegration of the empire in 1917 meant the door for their
national independence had been opened. However, the Bolshevik coup in October 1917
quickly frustrated their ambitions and threatened to extend Russian hegemony once more.
12

After the German authorities and the revolutionary Bolshevik government
concluded the treaty of Brest-Litovsk ending the conflict between them, many
Byelorussians found themselves in territories under German control. To ease their
administrative burden, the German forces sponsored the creation of the Belaruskaja
Narodnaja Respublika (Byelorussian People’s Republic) in March 1918. Nine months
later the short-lived regime ended as German forces withdrew from eastern Europe. A
struggle between the Red Army and the military of the newly-created Republic of Poland
ensued, and the peace settlement in 1920 drew the boundary between the Soviet Union
and Poland through the middle of Byelorussian territories. The redrawing of national
boundaries at the conclusion of the war only incorporated the eastern regions of
Byelorussian territory into the Soviet Union; the western territories and their large
Byelorussian population were included in the new Polish state.15 Byelorussian lands were
divided among their larger neighbors, and the population found itself torn between the
Soviet Union and the Republic of Poland. The first seeds of Byelorussian collaboration
with the Third Reich were then planted in interwar Poland, as anti-Bolshevik political
refugees from the Soviet Union became disillusioned with Polish rule and came into
contact with German intelligence operatives.
Several of these political enemies of the Soviet Union, such as Francizek Kushel,
Radoslaw Ostrowski, and Juri Sobolewski, feared arrest in their homeland for fighting
against the Red Army during the Russian Civil War and the Polish-Soviet War. Kushel,
later the leader of the Byelorussian military forces created for the Third Reich, had been a
young lieutenant in the Russian Army during the First World War. Born in Minsk in
15

Rein, The Kings and the Pawns, 57-60.
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1895, Kushel had attended an officer’s school in Vilno before being deployed. He was a
conservative young officer who fought against the Bolshevik forces during the Russian
Civil War following the October Revolution. At the outbreak of the Polish-Soviet War in
1919, Kushel joined a division of Lithuanians and Byelorussians that fought with the
Poles against the Red Army.16 A professional military man rather than an ardent
Byelorussian nationalist, Kushel served successfully with the Polish forces for two
decades. He rose to the rank of captain and remained in the Polish Army until his capture
by the Red Army in September 1939.17
Ostrowski, the future president of the Germans’ puppet regime and their most
influential collaborator, had a colorful political career that began as a student agitator.
Born in 1887, he enjoyed a privileged youth and a classical education as the only son of
prosperous landowning family that lived in Slutsk, a provincial center one hundred
kilometers south of Minsk.18 Although Ostrowski was listed as a reserve officer in the
Russian Army, unlike Kushel, he did not actually fight in the First World War. Ostrowski
was primarily a politician and agitator. After the Russian Revolution in 1917, he served
as the Minsk district delegate to the August 1917 Moscow State Conference of Alexander
Kerensky’s provisional Russian government. A Byelorussian nationalist seeking
independence from Moscow, Ostrowski became an intelligence agent for the antiBolshevik forces gathering in the Black Sea town of Mariupol in southern Ukraine. He
only served a few months with the White Army forces of General Denikin before he
16

“Operational: Franc(is)zek (Frantisek or Franz) Kuschel (Kusiel, Kuszal, or Kuszel),
September 12, 1950,” NARA, RG 263, Central Intelligence Agency Files (hereafter CIA),
Kushel, Francis, E ZZ-18, B 76.
17
Ibid.
18
V. Kalush, In the Service of the People for a Free Byelorussia: Biographical Notes on
Professor Radoslav Ostrowski (London: Abjednannie, 1964), 9.
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deserted in order to join the struggle for Byelorussian independence that had been
brewing while he was in Mariupol. Ostrowski was appointed Minister of Education in the
short lived Byelorussian National Republic, sponsored first by the retreating German
military and then by the Polish forces battling the Red Army. As the Polish military
began withdrawing in 1920 under the conditions of the Treaty of Riga, Ostrowski’s home
town became the site of the last attempt to assert Byelorussian independence. The
provincial capital became the epicenter of a massive revolt against the imposition of
Soviet authority.19 However, the improvised uprising was disorganized and outmatched
by the Soviet forces. Ostrowski and his compatriots fled to Poland before the Red Army’s
advance, where Polish authorities briefly interned him and the other members of the
Byelorussian National Republic. Ostrowski remained in Poland until the German forces
invaded in September 1939, when he began creating a Byelorussian organization in
Berlin.20
Ostrowski’s vice-president in the Byelorussian Central Council, Juri Sobolewski,
was an equally opportunistic politician. Sobolewski was born in 1889 in Stolpce,
approximately 75 kilometers southwest of Minsk. He received a classical Russian
education, attended four years of professional school to become a surveyor, and served in
the Russian Army from 1915 until the end of the First World War21 Then, like Kushel, he
fought against the Red Army until the end of the Polish-Soviet War. Finding refuge in

19

Vitali Silitski and Jan Zaprudnik, Historical Dictionary of Belarus (Lanham, MD: The
Scarecrow Press, Inc., 2007), 269-70.
20
Radoslaw Ostrowski, “Brief Biography,” NARA, RG 263, CIA, Ostrowski, Radoslaw,
E ZZ-18, B 98.
21
Harold F. Good, “Changed: George Sabolewski, was: Alexanderovitch Sokolowski,
Alexei Sokolovsky, August 2, 1951,” 5, NARA, RG 65, Federal Bureau of Investigation Files
(hereafter FBI), Sobolewski, George, E A1-136AB, B 129.
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Poland, Sobolewski became a personal and political rival of Ostrowski within the
Byelorussian community there.22
Many of these Byelorussian political refugees in Poland had developed a bitter,
personal antipathy to the Soviet Union, identifying themselves as the victims of an
oppressive and dehumanizing regime. Several of these future collaborators belonged to
wealthy so-called kulak families whose lands had been forcibly collectivized in the
1930s, and others lost family members to relocations and political purges. These antiSoviet refugees quickly came to view Poland antagonistically as well. The Polish
government did little to develop the infrastructure of the Byelorussian territories that
comprised its eastern borderlands, and the impoverished region became known in Polish
society as a backward land of subsistence agriculture. Poland as a whole suffered from a
great deal of poverty, but the destitution in the kresy was especially severe.23 The
widespread poverty in the region combined with the peasants’ resentment against the
disparaging attitudes of their wealthy Polish landlords to produce a bitterly anti-Polish
attitude in these already vehemently anti-Soviet émigrés.
Meager attempts by the Polish government to ameliorate these tensions failed.
The state granted mild concessions to the rights of the large Byelorussian minority in
eastern Poland, and in 1922 they were even permitted to send representatives to the
Polish parliament, or Sejm. Two of the most important future collaborators of the Third
Reich were among the handful of Byelorussians elected to the Sejm: Ostrowski and
Sobolewski. The Polish Government’s conciliatory gestures to the Byelorussian minority
backfired, as these Byelorussian nationalists in the Sejm used their positions as a mandate
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to criticize the Polish government. Their vocal opposition only escalated PolishByelorussian tensions, resulting in an oppressive Polonization campaign that negated the
Polish government’s few concessions and left a Byelorussian population embittered to
both Soviet and Polish rule.24 By the end of 1924, Polish authorities had closed hundreds
of Byelorussian schools, restricted the activities of the Byelorussian press and
Byelorussian politicians, and increased taxes in the kresy.25
Naturally, these oppressive measures further widened the rift between the
Byelorussian minority and the Polish authorities. Anti-Byelorussian Polish policies
rapidly produced more support for the cause of Byelorussian nationalism than its own
activists had achieved in years. Reacting against Polish authority, thousands of
Byelorussians flocked to left wing, yet nationalist political parties, including the
Communist Party of West Byelorussia and the newly created Byelorussian Workers’ and
Peasants’ Union (Hramada). These two parties, which merged communist political
platforms with nationalist tenets, were closely linked, and many Byelorussians held dual
memberships. In addition, the founder of the new Hramada, Branislau Taraskievic,
remained an active member of the Communist Party of West Byelorussia. His old friend,
Professor Radoslaw Ostrowski, served on the Central Committee of the new party.26
Sobolewski joined in February 1926.27
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By the late 1920s, the young Hramada had registered over 100,000 members and
posed a serious threat to stability in the Byelorussian territories of eastern Poland.28 In
early 1927, Polish authorities arrested thousands of Hramada members, charging them
with collaborating with Moscow to undermine the Polish Government. Ostrowski and
Sobolewski were both arrested, although both men managed to arrange for their freedom
well ahead of their colleagues.29 Sobolewski was released later that year, although he
later claimed to have served a four-year sentence after rejecting a vaguely defined
“proposition” from the authorities.30 As the director of the Byelorussian Cooperative
Bank, Ostrowski was charged with receiving funds “from Bolshevik sources” in order to
finance the “subversive activities of the Hramada.”31 Despite the gravity of the charges
against him, Ostrowski also managed to regain his freedom in a short time. Upon his
release, he relinquished his post with the bank, but returned to his previous position as the
director of the Byelorussian Gymnasium in Vilno, which became a center of Byelorussian
anti-Soviet and anti-Polish agitation. In 1935, Ostrowski was terminated, again on
charges of financial misconduct. Remarkably, he managed to avoid prison once again,
and he was transferred to a school far to the west in Lodz, where he remained until the
German invasion in 1939.32
Many other influential future collaborators served as educators in interwar
Poland. These men used their positions as educators and administrators working

28

Vakar, Belorussia, 126-127.
“Internal Security Report on George Sabolewski, December 20, 1951,” 3, NARA, RG
65, FBI, Sobolewski, George, E A1-136AB, B 129.
30
Ibid., 2; Robert K. McQueen, “Internal Security Report on George Sabolewski, January
15, 1951,” 2, NARA, RG 65, FBI, Sobolewski, George, E A1-136AB, B 129.
31
Kalush, In the Service of the People, 29.
32
Ostrowski, “Brief Biography,” 4.
29

18

throughout Byelorussia to influence a younger generation of nationalists who came of age
in this turbulent political atmosphere. Stanislaw Stankievich, the “butcher of Borisov,”
was one of the most notorious Byelorussian war criminals to collaborate with the
Germans in the massacres of Byelorussian Jews, but he began his professional life
teaching Byelorussian language and literature to high school students at a Gymnasium in
Dzisna, a small town on the Latvian border.33 Born in a small town in the Vilno region in
1907, Stankievich received his doctorate from the University of Vilno in 1936 for a wellreceived dissertation on Byelorussian influences in Polish romantic poetry.34 At the time
of the German invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941, Stankievich was teaching in Sovietcontrolled Byelorussian territory at a school in Navahrudak, an ancient town nearly 150
kilometers southwest of Minsk.35 Boris Ragula, born in Navahrudak in 1920, was
younger and less prudent than his colleagues. In early 1941, he was arrested by the
NKVD (the Soviet secret police) for politically subversive remarks made to his class, and
was imprisoned in Minsk until the Germans took control of the city in the summer of
1941.36 Ostrowski, Stankievich, and Ragula would soon tap into their extensive networks
of former students to organize Byelorussians in the service of the Third Reich. For
example, Vitaut Tumash, one of Ostrowski’s favorite pupils from the Gymnasium in
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Vilno, soon grew into an active early proponent of collaboration with the Third Reich,
and eventually served the Germans as the Byelorussian burgomaster of Minsk.37
Although tensions simmered between the Polish state and its Byelorussian
population throughout the entire interwar period, the 1930s began as a period of relative
calm after the tumult of the previous decade. German expansionism in the late 1930s
upset this precarious balance, as National Socialist designs on Polish and Soviet
territories increased the profiles of the Byelorussians as a potential fifth column for the
Germans to exploit in the impending war. According to one collaborator, Nazi Party
officials first contacted Byelorussian elements in Poland in 1937 with the “mission of
forming a [Byelorussian] National Socialist Party similar to the NSDAP.”38 Fabian
Akinczyc, the man entrusted with this mission, was a former NKVD agent who had also
worked for Polish intelligence. Rein explains that Akinczyc simply “aped the German
Nazis [sic] style and slogans” but failed to produce any significant support for his new
party.39 In 1939 he abandoned the effort to organize a Byelorussian Nazi Party and
traveled to Berlin to serve instead as the Germans’ expert on Byelorussian affairs.40
When the Red Army invaded Polish territory in mid-September 1939, many antiSoviet Byelorussians living in the Polish kresy fled to German-controlled central and
western Poland. Ostrowski’s former student Tumash fled westward to Warsaw with
several prominent political activists before continuing on to Berlin to study medicine.41
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Many had left their families behind in Soviet territory. Ostrowski was cut off from his
family in Vilno. The NKVD quickly arrested his wife and son, and his daughter went into
hiding. Ostrowski did not allow this personal blow to interfere with the opportunities
provided by the war, for by the end of September 1939, he had organized a Byelorussian
committee in Lodz to work with the German occupation forces.42 Similar organizations
were founded in major cities throughout occupied Poland, including Krakow, Poznan,
and Warsaw.
From the very beginning of the Second World War, Byelorussian leaders held few
illusions about the brutality of National Socialism’s racial hierarchy or political
worldview. Ostrowski would later explain that “the greatest impulse propelling all
nationalities to the formation of national organizations” at the beginning of the German
occupation was the fear of being lumped together with “the Poles and Jews,” who were
being “treated worst of all by the Germans.”43 In fact, the antisemitic, anti-Bolshevik, and
anti-Polish policies of the Third Reich reflected the goals and ideology of these
Byelorussian nationalist refugees, and Ostrowski was eager to deepen GermanByelorussian ties. He quickly went to work “organizing a central...committee in Berlin,
which would unite all of the existing [Byelorussian] committees” in Germany and
occupied Poland.44
Less eager Byelorussian collaborators frequently entered the service of the Third
Reich after arrest or capture by the Germans while fighting in the Polish Army. Francizek
Kushel, the future leader of the Byelorussian armed forces under the control of the SS,
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had remained in the Polish Army during the interwar years.45 While defending Lvov from
the German onslaught in September 1939, Kushel and his contingent received orders to
surrender to the advancing Red Army rather than the German forces. The officers were
taken into the custody of the NKVD that fall, and Kushel was interned in the notorious
camp at Starobilsk, Ukraine for eight months before being transferred to a camp near the
Katyn Forest in what had been eastern Poland.46 In April and May of the following
spring, thousands of Polish officers, policemen, and intelligentsia were murdered and
buried in mass graves by agents of the NKVD, in what became known as the Katyn
Massacre.47 Kushel was present to witness NKVD agents leading officers away from the
camp “in small groups” after March 1940.48 Transferred to a cell in NKVD headquarters
on Lubyanka Square in Moscow on May 17, 1940, he narrowly escaped becoming a
victim of the massacre. Although the reason Kushel survived this campaign of mass
murder remains obscure, a clue may be found in the fact that he shared his Moscow cell
with Polish General Wladyslaw Anders, who was released after the German invasion of
the Soviet Union in order to form a Polish military force under the auspices of the Red
Army.49 The Soviet authorities likely hoped that Kushel would create Byelorussian forces
for the Soviet war machine similar to Anders’ Army. Kushel’s wife, a well-known
Byelorussian poetess, managed to obtain his release in early June 1941 under condition of
45
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close NKVD monitoring. Kushel claimed he managed to evade Soviet authorities by
hiding in the forest until the German military swept the Red Army from the region.
Although one source stated that Kushel “actively collaborated with the NKVD, perhaps
in order to save his live [sic],” Kushel was an avowed Germanophile who “deeply
believed” that the Third Reich represented “a civilized, cultured nation” that could help
Byelorussia to gain its independence.50
Some Byelorussians captured while serving in the Polish army traveled to
Germany in order to work closely with the authorities of the Third Reich. Jan Avdziej, a
young man from Juri Sobolewski’s hometown of Stolpce in the Minsk region, would
become a notorious collaborator during the German occupation of Byelorussia. Like
Kushel, Avdziej was also captured by the Red Army while serving with the Polish
military in September 1939.51 Somehow Avdziej managed to escape and flee to
Germany, where he joined the central committee of Byelorussian collaborators organized
by Ostrowski.52 He worked closely with the Sicherheitsdienst (SD), the intelligence
service of the SS, and an acquaintance later recalled that Avdziej quickly developed a
reputation for being “sympathetic toward [the Nazis’] political beliefs.”53 Another young
Byelorussian collaborator, Stanislaw Hrynkievich, was captured by the Wehrmacht and
held in a prisoner of war camp until he went to work for the Byelorussian committee in
Berlin in 1941. Hrynkievich had attended the Gymnasium in Grodno before enrolling in
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the University of Vilno in 1934.54 In Vilno, Hrynkievich’s anti-Soviet Byelorussian
nationalism grew intensely passionate. Stating that his “hatred of Bolshevism” made him
willing to “work with the devil himself,” he then thrived in the capital of the Third Reich
during the Second World War, ascending to the leadership of the Byelorussian committee
in the German capital while pursuing his medical education at the University of Berlin.55
He also represented Byelorussia in the Deutsch-Ausländischer Akademiker Verein
(German-Foreign Academic Association), which met in Berlin under the auspices of the
National Socialist Students League.56
In 1940 the German authorities transferred Avdziej, Hrynkievich, and their
committee to Warsaw, where they joined a large Byelorussian émigré community
organizing themselves under the guidance of their German sponsors.57 Shortly after the
committee relocated to Warsaw, the German authorities revealed why they had
transferred the center of Byelorussian émigré activity to occupied Poland.58 Ostrowski
explained that German intelligence officers approached the Byelorussian committee in
early 1941 in order to “organize a parachute detachment to be dropped on the other side
of the demarcation line” separating German-occupied Poland from the oblasts of the
kresy incorporated into the Soviet Union.59 A military school for the training of
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Byelorussian parachutist saboteurs was quickly organized by the Germans in Ostrolenka,
a railroad junction town 120 kilometers northeast of Warsaw.60 However, this first
collaborative effort with the Germans did not produce the results the Byelorussian
émigrés had expected. During the spring months of 1941, German officers trained
Byelorussian recruits to handle parachutes and undertake sabotage on Soviet
communications and railroads. From the start, the German authorities assumed complete
operational control of these forces from the Byelorussian political activists who had
helped to muster them, and Ostrowski complained bitterly that “none of us were admitted
to participation in this operation.”61 The disillusionment of the Byelorussian committee
was compounded by the fact that more than half of the Byelorussian soldiers who
parachuted behind the Soviet lines on the eve of the German invasion were killed.62
Despite the evident failures of this first joint mission, the Byelorussian nationalists
working with the Germans retained their belief that the Third Reich’s aggressive
expansionism held the key to establishing an independent and ethnically homogeneous
Byelorussia by destroying Poland and the Soviet Union and liquidating their mutually
perceived political and racial enemies.

The Byelorussian nationalist émigrés working with the Third Reich before the
German invasion of the Soviet Union could entertain few illusions about the nature of
their relationship to the German authorities. They had witnessed the application of
National Socialist racial ideology in Germany and occupied Poland, and they had seen
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that the German authorities viewed them only as pawns to be used in furtherance of their
own war aims. The leaders of Nazi Germany had no interest in establishing an
independent Byelorussia, but instead intended to exploit these malcontented expatriates
and their knowledge of the anticipated theater of war. Despite their recognition of this
dynamic, the lofty personal ambitions of these Byelorussian nationalists and the antiCommunist fervor they shared with their Nazi sponsors combined to overcome the
collaborators’ objections and misgivings. In fact, Ostrowski and his cadre pushed for
closer collaboration with Nazi Germany.63 As German military forces invaded the Soviet
Union in June 1941, these collaborators scrambled to return to Byelorussia as guides and
informants. Once there, they organized auxiliary Byelorussian police forces and local
bureaucracies to facilitate the German administration of the conquered territories. Over
the course of the German occupation these men made themselves complicit in a variety of
crimes, including some of the most egregious atrocities of the Holocaust.
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PART 2
“FOLLOWING THE GERMAN LEAD”:
THE GERMAN OCCUPATION OF BYELORUSSIA, 1941-1943
Operation Barbarossa, the merciless German attack upon the Soviet Union, began
on June 22, 1941. From its inception, the war against the Soviet Union contained a
murderous ideological component. Battalions of the Einsatzgruppen immediately
followed the Wehrmacht into Soviet territories in order to eliminate those whom National
Socialist ideology deemed political and racial enemies of Germany, and the men who
would comprise the Byelorussian Central Council became involved in these campaigns
from the beginning. Guided and assisted by opportunistic collaborators such as Jasiuk,
Sobolewski, and Stankievich, the Einsatzgruppen committed mass murder and genocide
of hitherto unknown proportions.64 As German forces rapidly swept through Byelorussian
territories, they appointed their Byelorussian guides, mostly exiled collaborators, as the
local mayors and governors of their conquered homeland under the strict oversight of the
German military and civil administrations. In positions of authority, these men did the
bidding of their German overseers, created local auxiliary police and militia forces that
greatly facilitated the occupation, and made themselves responsible for the persecution,
torture, and deaths of thousands of innocent civilians. The German authorities relied on
the Byelorussian collaborators to facilitate the occupation of their homeland, but the
Third Reich initially paid the lowest possible price for this cooperation, offering few
concessions to the Byelorussian nationalist aspirations of their collaborators.
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“Generalplan Ost,” the German plan for the conquered territories of the Soviet
Union, was a vaguely-defined but brutal scheme to repopulate land coveted by the Nazis
with ethnic Germans. The extant populations were to be eliminated through war,
deportation, starvation, and mass murder. These plans for the reorganization of the
territories of the Soviet Union began as much of Europe was already under German
control, and the anticipation of a swift military victory initially caused confident planners
to construct grand plans for the reorganization of eastern Europe. In his classic study of
the German occupation of the Soviet Union, Alexander Dallin observes that “there is no
evidence…of high-level discussions of political problems-particularly of any attempt to
enlist the help of the Soviet population.”65 Detailed plans to exploit local collaborators
from among the disaffected anti-Communist national minorities of the Soviet Union were
neglected by German strategists.66 Instead, Nazi propaganda promoted the idea that the
conflict would be an epic war of annihilation against the most reviled scapegoats of Nazi
ideology: Communists, Jews, and Slavs. The virulent antisemitism and anticommunism
of National Socialism had always been integral planks of the party’s platform, and Hitler
had been referring to the entire Slavic people as an inferior race for decades.67
Accordingly, Operation Barbarossa and the occupation of the Soviet Union became the
very manifestation of Nazi racial theories through war.
Different German authorities interpreted Hitler’s vague directives with varying
levels of personal ambition, practical considerations, and political zealotry. The major
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competitors for influence in the conquered territories of the East included the
Schutzstaffel (SS), the Wehrmacht, and Alfred Rosenberg’s Ostministerium (Eastern
Ministry). The priorities and interests of these different groups conflicted with one
another and provoked constant struggles between them. Dallin describes “very broad and
vague directives prescribed from above,” which allowed for the implementation of
separate and distinct occupational policies at different times and in different places.68
This was especially true because of the rotating nature of any area’s occupation
authorities. As the front advanced, military administrations ceded control of rear areas to
civilian administrators under the nominal jurisdiction of the Ostministerium. The SS and
the Einsatzgruppen committed mass murder and provoked violent anti-Jewish pogroms
among the local populace, which conflicted with the Wehrmacht’s need to maintain order
in its rear areas and Rosenberg’s feeble attempts to foster collaborators in the territories
of the Soviet Union in order to maximize local cooperation with the occupation
authorities. This competition for influence continued for years, and in late 1943
Byelorussian territories became completely controlled by the SS.
The exploitation of local collaborators was initially hindered by Hitler’s wish that
”there should be no strong rulers in Russia,” but opportunistic Byelorussian antiCommunists like Ostrowski benefitted from the changing fortunes of the war and the
improvisational measures of the changing German administrations.69 The Wehrmacht, the
Ostministerium, and the SS interpreted Hitler’s vague directives differently and made the
execution of occupation policies a chaotic affair dependent upon the ambitions and
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personalities of the commanders, troops, and organizations stationed in a given area.
Dallin states that it is “impossible to speak of any distinct ‘policy’ pursued in the
occupied areas of Russia proper” because the severity of the occupation “varied from
village to village, from year to year, as commandants and detachments were moved.”70
The competition for influence among the different branches of the German government,
the vague policy directives issued by the top leaders of the Third Reich, and the
improvised measures of the frequently changing German administrators meant that the
Byelorussian collaborators’ aspirations were limited by and dependent upon the policies
of the particular German authorities for whom they worked.
As the date of the German invasion of the Soviet Union approached, the
Byelorussian émigrés recruited Byelorussian paramilitary forces for the Third Reich and
entered into the service of the Einsatzgruppen. Contact between the Byelorussian
committee in Warsaw and the designated leaders of the Einsatzgruppen began in the
spring of 1941, when a group of approximately thirty to forty Byelorussian émigrés was
assembled to serve as local guides and spies known as “people of trust”
(Vertrauensleute).71 The members of the Byelorussian committee also assembled an illfated cadre of hastily-trained airborne saboteurs in order to disrupt communications and
sow confusion. These Byelorussian guerrillas parachuted behind Soviet lines in mid-June,
but most of the men were quickly apprehended by the Soviet border guards.72 On June
22, 1941, German military forces attacked the Soviet Union along a broad front, and
several Byelorussian committee members serving as Vertrauensleute guided the German
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military and the Einsatzgruppen through the territories of their homeland. One of these
men, Emanuel Jasiuk, a member of the Warsaw committee, quickly became “well known
for his cruelty” as a guide for Vorkommando Moskau and an agent of the SD.73 Jasiuk
and his ilk were instrumental in the organization of collaboratorationist police forces,
politicians, and bureaucrats to assist in the administration of their conquered homeland.
In addition to facilitating the military invasion and occupation, these men were also
crucial to the identification of political and racial targets of Nazi persecution, compiling
lists of individuals to be executed by the German forces. Appointed to positions of
authority by their German masters, these collaborators even ordered the mass murder of
thousands of Jewish citizens.
As Operation Barbarossa began, the leaders of the Byelorussian committees in
Berlin and the cities of occupied Poland anxiously awaited news of the invasion. They
resented being marginalized by the German authorities in the training and deployment of
their Byelorussian parachutist saboteurs, and they eagerly sought ways to increase their
influence in the war effort and the occupation of Byelorussian territories. Several of the
leading personalities of the Byelorussian committees decided that they would have to find
a way to return to their homeland with the invading German forces. Leading the
Byelorussian committee in the occupied Polish city of Lodz, Professor Radoslaw
Ostrowski pressed upon his colleagues the importance of returning to Byelorussia. Vitaut
Tumash, a former student of Ostrowski’s at a Byelorussian Gymnasium in Vilno, had
joined his former teacher in Lodz earlier in 1941, and the two spearheaded the return of
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their fellow collaborationist Byelorussian anti-Communists to their war-torn homelands.
Ostrowski later recalled how he had immediately seen “the necessity of our getting to
Belorussia [sic]” in the wake of the German invasion, but had been forced to rely upon
Tumash’s contacts with the German authorities to accomplish this.74 Tumash had spent
the last several years studying medicine in Berlin, and the energetic young student had
made several influential friends there before moving to Lodz. According to Ostrowski,
“the Germans did not allow anyone to go at that time,” but his young protégé was rapidly
able to arrange efficient travel accommodations for them.75
On June 29, exactly one week after the German invasion began, Ostrowski sent
Tumash from Lodz in order to consult with Dr. Nikolai Schors, a leader of the
Byelorussian committee in Warsaw who worked closely with that city’s Gestapo. Two
days later Tumash telephoned Ostrowski from Warsaw to tell him that everything was
arranged for them to travel to Minsk, and he should prepare to leave within days.
Ostrowski later recalled how, “on July 3, at night, the Gestapo called for me with an
official car and toward morning of July 4th we were already in Warsaw….I was to go to
Minsk via Brest, Pinsk, Gomel, Bobruisk, in view of the fact that I knew these areas well
and had many acquaintances there.”76 Ostrowski did indeed have many acquaintances,
having spent many years as a teacher in various cities throughout Byelorussia, Lithuania,
and Poland.
Soviet resistance to the German invasion delayed the return of Ostrowski and four
other collaborators who departed Warsaw on July 4, but they finally arrived in the

74

Ostrowski, “The Belorussian Central Rada (Council), Past and Present,” 3.
Ibid.
76
Ibid.
75

32

Byelorussian capital on July 13. There they discovered that three weeks after Operation
Barbarossa had begun, the “young and ambitious” Tumash “had already become the
burgomaster of Minsk.”77 Martin Dean has explained that one of the first priorities of the
German forces involved appointing politically sympathetic local individuals as
burgomasters and police officers in order to secure German rear areas and leave German
manpower free for the advancing front.78 Ostrowski and his companions entered the
capital to find Soviet prisoners of war huddled miserably in public squares and the
registration of the city’s Jewish residents nearing completion. Within days, this
registration was completed, orders were issued for Jews to wear yellow stars, and a ghetto
was formed.79 Tumash’s signature appeared at the bottom of the order for the
establishment of the Minsk ghetto.80
As the brutal relocation of the city’s approximately 75,000 Jewish residents
continued, Ostrowski blithely set out to prove himself an ambitious and energetic asset to
the German military administration, who assigned him to organize a local auxiliary
administrative network for the Minsk oblast. “This task was easy for me,” Ostrowski later
wrote proudly, “because I had acquaintances in almost every district and area. Exactly a
week later, having been supplied with military transport, I had been able to organize 21
raions in the Minsk oblast.”81 This involved recruiting political collaborators and police
officials to support the German occupation and identifying potential enemies of the Reich
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for imprisonment or liquidation. Suitable individuals were found to become burgomasters
of towns and cities, although their authority was limited by their ability to carry out the
orders of the German administration officials to whom they remained responsible.
Ostrowski remained proud of this feat years later, boasting that he had “astonished and
impressed the Germans” with his organizational abilities.82
As the front advanced, responsibility for the occupied territories shifted from the
German military administration to a civilian administration nominally under the direction
of Rosenberg’s Ostministerium. In September, 1941, Generalkommissar Wilhelm Kube
and the civil administration took control of the Minsk oblast from the German military.
Ostrowski claims that Kube asked him personally to stay on in his capacity coordinating
the administration of the oblast for the new civil authorities. Tumash agreed to stay in his
position as the burgomaster of Minsk as well.83 However, they soon found it difficult to
work with the civil administration. Ostrowski believed that his position had become
superfluous once individuals had been appointed to lead the towns and districts of the
oblast, and the ambitious politician felt that his talents and energies were being
squandered. In addition, the arrival of the German civil authorities in Minsk coincided
with the arrival of additional Byelorussian collaborators from occupied Prague, and these
men competed with Ostrowski and his cadre from occupied Poland for influence with
their German bosses. Not surprisingly, internecine feuding quickly erupted among the
Byelorussian collaborators in Minsk, and according to Ostrowski, “they all aspired to
leadership, an infection they had caught from Hitler.”84 Ostrowski was always careful to
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paint himself as a reluctant wielder of power, only accepting the burden of leadership
after acceding to the desperate pleas of others. However, he was as ambitious and
opportunistic as his competitors from Prague, and when the latter became dominant in the
battle for influence with the German civil administration, Ostrowski indignantly left
Minsk.
In October 1941, on the initiative of Kube, a Byelorussian aid organization was
created to take over the functions of the Red Cross. One of Ostrowski’s chief rivals, Dr.
Ivan Ermachenko, was appointed by Rosenberg to lead the organization.85 Although
Ermachenko had been a leading Byelorussian nationalist in Prague in the interwar years,
his admiration of all things German earned him a reputation as an avowed and
enthusiastic Germanophile. Married to an ethnic German, Ermachenko drew criticism
from his fellow Byelorussian nationalists before the war for “following the German lead
too closely.”86 Ermachenko admired National Socialism, and attempted to ingratiate
himself to the German authorities shortly after the occupation of Prague in the spring of
1939.87 On April 20,1939, he sent a seventeen-page memorandum personally asking
Hitler to consider the Byelorussian nationalist groups in any “future developments” in the
East.88 He had even traveled to Berlin in August 1939 in order to meet with the head of
the Eastern Department of the German Foreign Ministry.89 His close political affinity
with the Third Reich and his ties in Berlin led directly to his appointment to the
leadership of the newly created aid organization. The statute of his organization reflected
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its leader’s beliefs, declaring that it existed in order “...to liquidate in Byelorussia a
misfortune...raised by the Polish and Communist-Jewish dominion.”90 Ermachenko’s
Nazi sympathies and his sycophantic posture towards his German bosses in Minsk earned
him the moniker “Herr Jawohl” among his peers and the local population.91
The appointment of Ermachenko to the leadership of the Byelorussian aid
organization catapulted the obsequious physician into an important position with the new
German authorities just as Ostrowski’s own influence seemed to be waning. Ostrowski’s
department in the German administrative headquarters in Minsk was redesignated a
Nebenstelle (a secondary or subsidiary office), and he later ruefully recalled how “when
everything had been arranged I was left with only one statistics department.”92 Reacting
against his reduced influence, Ostrowski petulantly informed Kube “that there was
actually nothing for me to do” in Minsk, and he attempted to resign from his position in
order to pursue his teaching career.93 Kube refused to accept his resignation, and
temporarily mollified Ostrowski by offering him the position of rector at the teaching
college in Minsk.
Ostrowski’s dissatisfaction with his diminished prestige in the offices of the
German civil administration could not be assuaged, and by the end of the month he found
a specious reason to resign dramatically from his position with the civil administration
and rejoin his “former colleagues in the Military Administration Headquarters” on their
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drive towards Moscow.94 On the evening of October 30, Ostrowski was dining with
guests at his apartment in Minsk when the civilian administration’s German police
interrupted their meal, saying that they had orders from the chief of the German police in
Minsk to confiscate his radio. Although Ostrowski’s radio was playing music in the
background, he disdainfully informed the astonished police that he had no radio.95 An
officer pointed at the device, exclaiming, “But there it is!”96 Ostrowski coolly replied that
the radio belonged to one of his guests, a former student of his who now worked for a
Geheime Feldpolizei (Secret Field Police) unit attached to Germany’s Army Group
Center.97 With a high degree of independence and extensive police powers, the GFP had
developed an intimidating reputation for torture and terror, becoming known as the
“Gestapo of the Wehrmacht.”98 After learning of Ostrowski’s guest’s position, the
intimidated German police officer saluted and left them to their meal.99 Ostrowski
immediately notified the German military administration that he wished to accompany
them in their eastward advance the following morning, and he sat down to write Kube a
furious letter. Ostrowski claimed that it was written “in correct form,” although he
conceded that “the language was somewhat sharp.”100 Although he made much out of this
incident, in reality Ostrowski’s anger stemmed from being replaced by Ermachenko when
Generalkommissar Kube and the civilian administration assumed control of the
conquered Byelorussian territories.
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Traveling eastward in the wake of the invading German armies, Ostrowski
organized networks of local collaborators in Smolensk, approximately halfway between
Minsk and Moscow. He expected to be installed as the burgomaster of Moscow once the
Soviet capital fell to the German forces.101 The foundering German invasion and the
resilience of the Red Army derailed these plans, however, and Ostrowski fled westward
to Mogilev in 1943 as the Wehrmacht continued its retreat. In Mogilev, Ostrowski served
as head of the municipal council and organized a Byelorussian police school under
German auspices.102
While Ostrowski and other collaborators energetically organized Byelorussian
bureaucrats and police for the German occupation authorities, German forces oversaw
massacres of civilians, often relying on the assistance of local collaborators. Historian
Waitman Beorn, whose scholarship has established the Wehrmacht’s complicity in the
Holocaust in Byelorussia, has observed that “soldiers and Nazi executioners literally
traveled together from the beginning.”103 The Einsatzgruppen had been actively
conducting the mass murder of Jews since the beginning of Operation Barbarossa.
Einsatzgruppe B followed Army Group Centre through Byelorussian territories on the
drive towards Moscow, and with the assistance of regular Wehrmacht and police units,
they destroyed many of the Jewish communities of Byelorussia in the first months of
Germany’s war upon the Soviet Union. When the German forces invaded in late June
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1941, approximately 375,000 Jews lived in Byelorussian territories; by the end of the
year nearly 200,000 of these civilians had been brutally murdered.104
The members of the Einsatzgruppen and the soldiers of the Wehrmacht who
committed these atrocities could not have conducted these mass executions so efficiently
without the assistance of local collaborators who served as guides and identified potential
political and racial enemies of the Third Reich for liquidation. Indeed, an Einsatzgruppe
report from July 1941 stated that without local Vertrauensleute, “German soldiers are not
always able to distinguish between the Jewish and the local non-Jewish residents.”105
Some of these Byelorussian collaborators included “the cream of the intelligentsia,” such
as Stanislaw Stankievich.106 This cosmopolitan scholar of Slavic philology would enjoy
“many positions of trust” under the German occupation in the years to come.107 At the
time of the German invasion, he was teaching at a Gymnasium in Navahrudak,
approximately 150 kilometers west of Minsk.108 Einsatzgruppe B arrived in Navahrudak
on July 3, 1941 and massacred approximately 100 Jews.109 Dr. Franz Six, the SS leader
and head of the forward unit of Einsatzgruppe B (optimistically named Vorkommando
Moskau), personally chose Stankievich to assist the mobile killing units on their path
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through Byelorussia.110 After briefly serving Vorkommando Moskau, Stankievich was
installed by the German military authorities as the burgomaster of Borissow, a mediumsized city nearly 100 kilometers northeast of Minsk on the Berezina River.
The German authorities quickly established local administrative organs in
Borissow, and anti-Jewish actions began almost immediately. A report filed by
Einsatzgruppe B on July 23, 1941 states that a local Jewish council (Judenrat) had been
established under the authority of Borissow’s newly appointed, “reliable” burgomaster.111
Eager to prove his value in this new position of authority, Stankievich zealously began
arrangements for the ghettoization of approximately 8,000 Jewish residents of the region
in the poorest areas of the city. Rein writes that Stankievich “was active in all stages of
the extermination process, issuing orders for the ghettoization...‘taxing’ ghetto
inmates...and, ultimately...bearing direct responsibility for the massacre of between 6,500
and 7,000 members of the Jewish community in October 1941.”112
On the night of October 19, 1941 Stankievich threw a “wild party” for the
Byelorussian auxiliary police forces of Borissow, where the men got “properly drunk” in
anticipation of the planned early morning ghetto clearing action.113 The police entered the
ghetto at approximately 3:00 on the morning of October 20. According to David Ehof,
the local ethnic German in command of Borissow’s Byelorussian police, they “broke into
the Jewish houses, chased the people to the square in the centre of the ghetto, drove them
into the vehicles by force and transported them to the place of execution. There was no
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mercy shown either to old people, children, pregnant women, or the sick.”114 By sunrise
nearly 7,000 of Borissow’s 8,000 Jewish residents had been taken to the outskirts of
town.115 Near the airport outside of the city long trenches had been dug on the side of the
road. Here the drunken Byelorussian police forced their Jewish victims to undress and
climb down into the pits. After the first Jewish men were shot, the following victims were
forced at gunpoint to arrange the contorted bodies neatly before sprinkling a layer of dirt
over them and lying down head to toe on top of the corpses and awaiting their own
execution.116 This system became known as the Ölsardinenmanier (sardine method), and
was developed in order to save space in the mass graves.117 In order to save ammunition,
Stankievich had also thought “to shoot through a double row of bodies....to cover the
wounded with a thin layer of dirt and then suffocate them beneath another double layer of
bodies.”118
Sadism pervaded the execution site outside of town. Young women were raped
before being forced into the death pits, babies were thrown into the trenches alive, men
were clubbed to death with rifle butts, and the bodies of the dead were mutilated.119 The
architect of these atrocities was not present at the execution site during the massacre.
Years later, Stankievich confided to a colleague that he had absented himself to the
countryside rather than witness the bloody realization of his planning firsthand.120 After
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the atrocious behavior of the Byelorussian police during the execution of the Jews of
Borissow, Stankievich returned to the city and received a promotion to the leadership of
the entire Baranovichi oblast to the southwest of Minsk as reward for the successful
completion of the gruesome operation.121 Baranovichi, the second largest city in
Byelorussia, was home to approximately 15,000 Jewish citizens when Stankievich
assumed control of the city’s administration in early spring 1942. Another 50,000 Jews
lived in the regions of the oblast outside of the city proper.122 Just as in Borissow,
Stankievich immediately began organizing a Jewish ghetto in the poorest section of the
city in preparation for the mass murder of the region’s Jewish population.123
Emanuel Jasiuk, “Stankievich’s deputy” in Vorkommando Moskau, had been
recruited while working with the Byelorussian committee in Warsaw before Operation
Barbarossa began.124 He traveled with the vanguard unit of Einsatzgruppe B as far as
Baranovichi oblast, where he worked for the SD before being appointed by the German
administration as the burgomaster of the region surrounding the nearby town of Kletsk.125
Jasiuk and Stankievich had similar backgrounds. Both men came from wealthy families,
spent time abroad, and fluently spoke several languages. They were also classmates at
Vilno University, a center of Byelorussian nationalist activism at that time.126 When the
Red Army invaded the Polish kresy in September 1939, Jasiuk fled west to Warsaw,
where he worked on the Byelorussian committee under German control until returning to
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Byelorussia with the Einsatzgruppen in the summer of 1941. Like Stankievich, this
highly educated and well-traveled man quickly developed a reputation for cruelty and
barbarism.
The inhabitants of the rural region that surrounded the small, provincial town of
Kletsk did not initially encounter nearly as many Germans as their neighbors in larger
Nieswicz or Baranovichi. In the Kletsk area, Jasiuk and the local auxiliary police were
practically the only agents of German authority the local residents encountered for the
entire first year of the occupation.127 Jasiuk was left responsible for selecting and
equipping the members of the local police, many of whom had no uniforms, rifles, or
training for nearly the entire occupation.128 As burgomaster, Jasiuk proposed individual
candidates for the Byelorussian auxiliary police force, the vast majority of whom were
young male peasants.129
Jasiuk used this police force to persecute the region’s Polish and Jewish
population. The local Polish intelligentsia became the first victims of the National
Socialist racial ideologies imposed by Jasiuk and his untrained and undisciplined
auxiliary police.130 The redacted portions of a 1951 CIA report summarizing an
investigation into his past reveal that Jasiuk had personally “submitted names of Poles
living in Nieswiecz...who were later shot.”131 He also compiled lists of residents in other
towns in the region for execution by the SD in Baranovichi, including several priests.132
Jasiuk later stated that the only religious leader to be killed in the areas under his control
127
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was his own wife’s father, an Orthodox priest, who Jasiuk claimed was shot while
visiting the area.133 After the war Jasiuk testified that neither the German nor the
Byelorussian police murdered his father-in-law, but instead the culprits were “Russian
Protestants who roamed the hills and came from across the border.”134 It is far more
likely that these “Russian Protestants” were partisan assassins targeting Jasiuk’s family as
a reprisal for his complicity in the persecution of the local populace.
Jasiuk became notorious for ordering massacres of racial and political enemies of
the Reich who lived in the area under his authority. In a single day in 1942,
approximately 5,000 Jewish residents of the region were massacred under his direction
and buried in ditches behind the Arinskaya Church in Kletsk.135 Jasiuk later painted
himself as an unwitting pawn who was powerless to resist. In 1951, a CIA investigator
reported that Jasiuk stated “that everyone worked together...and that they were helpless to
oppose the Germans.”136 However, as Rein reveals, the population of Kletsk saw almost
no Germans during the first year of the occupation.137 Jasiuk himself was the architect of
these murders, and the police forces under his control were the executioners. In Kletsk,
Emanuel Jasiuk wielded remarkable power over the lives of the region’s inhabitants,
personally selecting both the members of the police and the victims of their persecution.
After several years of trusted service to the German administration, Jasiuk rose to become
the burgomaster of the entire Stolpce district.138
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Several other Byelorussian collaborators appointed as local burgomasters by the
Germans also became heavily involved in the persecution and murder of the political and
racial targets of Nazi ideology, while many future leaders of the Byelorussian Central
Council worked as Vertrauensleute in the Baranovichi area. Jan Avdziej, an active
member of the Byelorussian committees in both Berlin and Warsaw, traveled to
Baranovichi with the advancing German forces in the immediate aftermath of the
invasion. Like Jasiuk, Avdziej was transferred to the SD, where he quickly revealed his
sympathy for the anti-Polish and antisemitic tenets of National Socialist ideology.139 The
first of the discriminatory acts for which he became notorious in Baranovichi was the
dismissal of Polish civil servants from administrative posts in the district. Avdziej also
caused the arrests of an untold number of the Polish intelligentsia of the region, including
“professors, priests, [and] former military personnel.”140 He knew the area well, for
Baranovichi lay only seventy kilometers from his hometown of Stolpce, and only fifty
kilometers from Nieswicz, where his brother Alexander was serving the German
administration as the town’s burgomaster.141 Drawing upon his deep familiarity with the
residents of the region, Avdziej compiled a list of 120 members of the local Polish
intelligentsia and played an active role in the arrest and execution of these individuals.142
Avdziej earned the trust of the German authorities through his zealous work with the SD,
and in November 1941 he was selected by the German civil administration to become the
burgomaster of his hometown of Stolpce before being promoted to head the entire
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Nieswicz district. As burgomaster of the region, Avdziej helped to organize the mass
execution of several thousand of the region’s Jewish inhabitants.143
Juri Sobolewski, Avdziej’s predecessor as the mayor of Stolpce, collaborated with
both the invading Soviet forces in 1939 and the representatives of the Third Reich during
the German occupation. Sobolewski had been a political rival and a “personal enemy” of
Ostrowski’s before the war, but after the German invasion of the Soviet Union
Sobolewski joined Ostrowski’s faction as they allied themselves with the Third Reich in
the hopes of exploiting the situation to further their own ambitions.144 This wealthy,
opportunistic former deputy to the Polish Sejm had cravenly organized a welcoming
committee to greet the Red Army when it invaded the region in mid-September 1939, and
when the Wehrmacht arrived in the summer of 1941, he began collaborating with the
German occupation.145 Sobolewski’s warm reception for the invading Soviet forces in the
fall of 1939 had not protected him from incarceration for his youthful activism as a
Byelorussian nationalist opposed to Soviet rule of his homeland; he was imprisoned by
the Soviet authorities until German forces overran Stolpce and reinstated him as mayor.
German authorities quickly promoted Sobolewski to the position of burgomaster of the
larger city of Baranovichi, and Avdziej succeeded him as mayor of Stolpce.
Sobolewski denied that either his escape or his appointments were due to direct
German intervention. He claimed that “during the confusion of the attack and the air raids
which were going on, the wall of his prison cell was blown away.”146 The heavyset, aging
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mayor implausibly testified that he climbed through this convenient hole in the wall of
his prison cell, simply walked “into the German lines,” and then “resumed his duties as
mayor of Stolpce” as if he had only been returning from a brief holiday.147 Shortly after
his release from prison, the German authorities transferred Sobolewski to Baranovichi,
where he served as burgomaster from July 1941 until June 1943. Postwar FBI
investigations into his past revealed that during his tenure as burgomaster of Baranovichi,
Sobolewski became responsible for innumerable “actions of brutality,” worked closely
with the Gestapo, and was integral in the persecution of the city’s Jewish and Polish
communities.148
In June 1943 Sobolewski moved to Minsk in order to replace Ermachenko as head
of the Byelorussian aid organization established by Kube.149 The sycophantic
Ermachenko had occupied the top position in the organization since his appointment by
Rosenberg in October 1941, and his influence had expanded further upon his
appointment as Kube’s personal “man of confidence” in June 1942.150 At the same time,
Kube named Ermachenko as the “supreme commandant” of several newly created,
irregular anti-partisan units organized along the lines of the Freikorps of post-WWI
Germany.151 Ermachenko’s ambitions were so great that he “saw himself as no less than
the future leader of Byelorussia,” but the ascendant career of “Herr Jawohl” came to an
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abrupt end the following year.152 In spring 1943 Ermachenko was arrested and tortured in
the cellars of the SD headquarters in Minsk for accusations of corruption and high
treason.153 Although Ermachenko had made no secret of the fact that he had thrown
lavish parties, sent money to his family abroad, and “done whatever he pleased” with the
funds raised by the Byelorussian aid organization, he was eventually released under the
condition that he return to his home in Prague and retire from political activity of any
kind.154 Meanwhile, the Byelorussian anti-partisan units created under Ermachenko had
grown to a reported 15,000 volunteers due to the recruiting and organizing work of
energetic and efficient collaborators such as Boris Ragula and Francizek Kushel, the
chief of the Byelorussian police forces in Minsk.155
Like Sobolewski, Ragula claimed that he escaped from a Soviet prison in June
1941 without help from the German authorities.156 After the war, none of the members of
the BCC wished to admit that the German forces had released them from prison in order
to collaborate with the Third Reich. In September 1938, Ragula received notice that he
had been drafted as a reservist in the Polish Army.157 He applied himself with zeal and
graduated from the reserve officers’ training course in June 1939, becoming a lieutenant
in command of a platoon of approximately sixty soldiers.158 In his memoirs, Ragula
described his capture by German forces in mid-September 1939 and how favorably
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impressed he had been by his first encounter with a German officer: “To my surprise, he
shook my hand and offered me a cigarette. When he learned that I was a Belarusian
national he asked me why I was fighting the Germans, who supported the Belarusian
people. I had no answer.”159
Ragula claimed that he escaped from German custody, evaded the Soviet border
guards, and made his way back to his hometown of Navahrudak, approximately 150
kilometers west of Minsk.160 The young man had learned German in high school and was
able to obtain a position teaching German at the local Gymnasium. However, he was
arrested by the NKVD on suspicion of subversive activities in January 1941.161 Like
Sobolewski, Ragula claimed that he escaped without German assistance and somehow
managed simply to “get behind the German lines.”162 In reality, the invading German
forces freed many political prisoners of the Soviet authorities who became crucial
collaborators during the German occupation.163 After his release, Ragula traveled back to
Navahrudak, where he immediately began working as the interpreter and liaison officer
between the German military administration and the local officials selected by Ostrowski
in mid-July 1941.164
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Intelligent and ambitious, the multilingual Ragula quickly ingratiated himself to
his German boss and “developed an easy working relationship” with him.165 He received
many special privileges and favors as a result of his eager cooperation. Ragula and Traub,
his German supervisor, frequently traveled the region together, and the young
Byelorussian became responsible for interrogating local citizens suspected of Communist
sympathies or activities.166 Ragula even accompanied his chief on a trip through
Germany in April 1942. He recalled that on this trip, Traub “granted me unlimited
freedom to explore the cities at which we stopped to rest.”167 Ragula even was permitted
to take a car and drive around the German countryside unescorted.168 Ragula also taught
German at the Navahrudak Gymnasium, where he enthusiastically organized
Byelorussian youths and trained them in the “military arts.”169
Meanwhile, Kushel had become the highest-ranking local police leader in
German-occupied Byelorussia.170 Although Kushel had only held the official title of
“chief military advisor” to Ermachenko for the Byelorussian Freikorps, it was he who
had handled the military affairs of these underequipped and poorly trained Byelorussian
anti-partisan units.171 One of the few survivors of the massacre of thousands of Polish
officers by Soviet forces in the Katyn forest in 1940, Kushel had been released from
imprisonment in NKVD headquarters in Moscow in June 1941. When he returned to
Minsk, becoming the Byelorussian chief of the city’s local police force and the rector of
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the city’s Byelorussian police school after the German invasion.172 In summer 1943, SSGruppenführer und Generalleutnant der Polizei Kurt von Gottberg promoted Kushel,
making him the chief of the entire Byelorussian auxiliary police force.173 Ostensibly,
Kushel now exercised control over every aspect of the Byelorussian police, but these
auxiliary forces remained under the control of German police officials.174 Kushel’s main
task in his new position was actually the dissemination of German propaganda.175
1943 became an important year for the opportunistic and competitive
Byelorussian nationalists. Escalating partisan warfare in Byelorussian territories and the
enormous German losses at Stalingrad months earlier caused German planners to
consider relying on Byelorussian nationalists on a greater scale.176 After Ermachenko’s
arrest, Sobolewski became the head of the Byelorussian aid committee, and on June 27,
1943, a newspaper announcement proclaimed the creation of a new anti-partisan military
organization called the Byelorussian Regional Defense (Belaruskaja Krajovaja Abarona,
or BKA) and a new council of trusted collaborators (Vertrauensrat).177 Sobolewski,
Stankievich, and Ragula all joined the Vertrauensrat, created by Kube .178 The growing
threat from the Soviet partisans was the primary reason for the creation of the
Vertrauensrat and the BKA, but Sobolewski’s first months serving as the leader of
Generalkommissar Kube’s new advisory committee and the head of the aid organization
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coincided with increasing violence behind the German lines and more brazen attacks
upon German administration authorities in Minsk.179
On September 22, 1943, Yelena Mazanik, a young Byelorussian partisan posing
as a housemaid in Generalkommissar Kube’s home, placed a small time bomb under his
bed. The device exploded that night, killing Kube while he slept.180 In the last months of
his life, General Commissioner for Byelorussia Wilhelm Kube had sponsored the creation
of a small Byelorussian advisory body as well as the Byelorussian Regional Defense. An
ardent Nazi since the 1920s, Kube had little if any sympathy for the nationalist
aspirations of the Byelorussians. However, the deteriorating military situation, the
growing partisan threat, and the shortage of manpower caused by the casualties of the
front lines caused Kube and other German policy makers to pragmatically consider the
expansion of local auxiliary forces. Following Kube’s assassination, Hitler appointed SS
General Kurt von Gottberg as General Commissar for Byelorussia. Rosenberg had
wanted to appoint another candidate of his own choosing, but the machinations of
Gottlob Berger, the head of the political department of the Ostministerium and
“Himmler’s man,” succeeded in convincing Hitler to name Gottberg as Kube’s successor
instead.181 Gottberg’s appointment as acting Generalkommissar meant that the SS and
police leader was now also the head of the civilian administration, which put Byelorussia
completely under the control of the SS. Faced with increasing manpower shortages, a
rapidly deteriorating military situation, and the escalating partisan threat, Gottberg
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formulated plans to exploit Byelorussian nationalist impulses further than his predecessor
by creating a local puppet regime that could appeal directly to the population.

Although the Byelorussian collaborators had hoped to take advantage of the
German invasion of the USSR as the first step towards an autonomous and ethnically
homogenous Byelorussian state built from the ashes of war, German authorities only
granted minimal concessions to Byelorussian nationalist aspirations until the tide of the
war turned against Germany in 1943. The Byelorussian collaborators had eagerly
facilitated the invasion, identified political and racial enemies of the Reich for
liquidation, and made themselves complicit in innumerable atrocities during the first
years of the German occupation. However, their ambitions remained frustrated. Only
after the Red Army regained the offensive and partisan warfare seriously compromised
the security of the rear areas of German-occupied Soviet territories did the German
authorities consider supporting limited Byelorussian nationalist aspirations in order to
mobilize the Byelorussian population for the German war effort. The racial ideology of
National Socialism held the Slavic Byelorussians in only slightly less contempt than their
Russian cousins, and German policy makers intended to use these men merely as pawns
in order to relieve their administrative burdens and facilitate the brutal exploitation
planned for the conquered territories. However, the ambitious collaborators took
advantage of every opportunity to expand their power, and for decades after the war these
men cited their appointments by the SS to validate their claims to represent a legitimate
government-in-exile.
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PART 3
“WE WERE WILLING TO COLLABORATE”:
THE BEGINNING OF THE BYELORUSSIAN CENTRAL COUNCIL, 1943-1944
The appointment of SS and police leader Kurt von Gottberg as Generalkommissar
for Byelorussia after the assassination of Kube marked a turning point in the relationship
between the forces of the German occupation and its Byelorussian collaborators. The
exigencies of the war caused Gottberg to call for the creation of an ostensibly
autonomous Byelorussian governing body, which would transmit German edicts to the
population and execute German policies as if they had formulated them independently.
Gottberg created the Byelorussian Central Council in December 1943, and although its
members publicly espoused Byelorussian nationalist sentiments to the population, their
obsequious behavior toward their German sponsors undermined their claims to autonomy
and independence. The Byelorussian collaborators eagerly acceded to Gottberg’s
proposal, accepted his complete control of their organization, and energetically began
propagandizing and mobilizing the population in support of the German war effort. The
members of the BCC continued ingratiating themselves to their German sponsors until
the Reich crumbled, when they abandoned their erstwhile benefactors in order to save
themselves and preserve the nominally independent governing body they had formed
under the sponsorship of the SS.
Appointed to combat the escalating threat from the growing partisan movement
responsible for the assassination of his predecessor, Gottberg immediately expanded the
use of auxiliary Byelorussian paramilitary forces to combat the partisans. Shortly after
Gottberg’s appointment, Gebietskommissar Traub in Navahrudak requested that Ragula
54

meet him at his home to discuss the increased German interest in utilizing Byelorussian
paramilitary forces to counter the growing partisan threat. Traub explained that
Generalkommissar Gottberg had decided to create a volunteer Byelorussian cavalry unit
of approximately 150 men stationed in Navahrudak, which would be known as the
Eskadron (squadron).182 Ragula was thrilled, for he had been putting his students through
military training in the hopes that they might form the nucleus of an independent
Byelorussian army in the future. The charismatic young teacher knew that he would have
no trouble organizing the necessary volunteers from among his students. He recalled how
“within a week, we had 150 men ready to join the Belarusian Eskadron. Our soldiers
wore grey German uniforms with the Belarusian insignia (a double cross) and the redand-white flag emblazoned on the collars and sleeves.”183 These volunteers would soon
form the core of a larger Byelorussian military force created by Gottberg for absorption
into the German military apparatus.
Although Gottberg had earned a reputation for cruelty during his career and
believed in simply “quelling resistance with iron and blood,” he chose to assume a
conciliatory posture with the Byelorussian collaborators in order to cultivate support for
the harsh and unpopular German occupation.184 In the weeks following his appointment
as Generalkommissar, Gottberg began meeting with Sobolewski in order to discuss the
possibilities of expanding cooperation between the SS and the ambitious Byelorussian
nationalists. Although Gottberg believed that the Byelorussian people did not truly exist
as a nation and were merely “the invention of Berlin armchair politicians,” in December
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1943 he decided to create a Byelorussian puppet government in order to act as a
mouthpiece for German propaganda and facilitate the mobilization of Byelorussian
military volunteers to aid in the foundering German war effort.185
On the evening of December 19, 1943, Sobolewski sent an urgent telegram to
Ostrowski in Baranovichi, where he had fled after watching the Red Army reoccupy the
territories of eastern Byelorussia he had recently organized for the German
administration. Although the telegram did not specify the reason, it urged Ostrowski to
come to Minsk immediately. Ostrowski later wrote, “I was struck by the fact that the
telegram had been received through the District Commissariat and brought to me by an
official of the Commissariat, Mr. Michke. This was at 11 at night.”186 Michke contributed
to the sense of mystery and urgency. He did not reveal Sobolewski’s reason for
summoning the former professor to Minsk, but when Ostrowski declared that he would
be able to take the next passenger train out of Baranovichi at noon the following day,
Michke replied that he had already arranged a place for him on a German military train
passing through Baranovichi at three o’clock in the morning and volunteered to send a
car to take Ostrowski to meet the train.187
The following morning at eight o’clock Ostrowski was standing in Sobolewski’s
apartment in Minsk, where he learned about the recent discussions with Gottberg for the
first time. The two proceeded to a meeting of the leading Byelorussian collaborators, the
chief of the Minsk SD, and the head of personnel for the German administration in the
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offices of the Byelorussian Vertrauensrat.188 There they listened to an address by Nikolai
Shkelenok, a lawyer who had been a member of the Byelorussian central committee in
Berlin before returning to Minsk with the German invasion of the Soviet Union in
1941.189 Shkelenok explained that he and Sobolewski had been discussing the
deteriorating situation in Byelorussia with Gottberg, and the Generalkommissar had
finally decided that it was in the administration’s interest to cultivate limited
Byelorussian nationalist aspirations by reorganizing the advisory council into the
Byelorussian Central Council. The BCC would assume minor administrative functions
and was expected to nurture anti-Soviet Byelorussian nationalism in the population in
order to mobilize support for the Third Reich’s war effort.
Ostrowski later described how the SS authorities at this meeting then casually
drafted the statutes for this “independent Belorussian agency.”190 These consisted of
several main points, many of which specifically reserved for Gottberg and the German
authorities the ultimate responsibility for the direction of the council, its military forces,
and its membership. The charter provided that the president of the BCC could be
“assigned and/or removed from his post by the General Commissioner,” and although the
council’s president held the power to appoint the other members of the BCC, this could
only be done “with the approval of the General Commissioner.”191 The charter stated that
the mission of the BCC would be “to mobilize all the manpower available from the
Byelorussian people for the annihilation of the communists,” and any other
188
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administrative tasks would have to be accomplished “within the framework of German
rule.”192 Although Ostrowski claimed that the “authoritative” and “independent”
Byelorussian Central Council had “incomparably greater authority” than the advisory
body that preceded it, the German authorities had drafted the statutes of the BCC to
express the subservient position of the nascent puppet government to the Third Reich
with no room for misunderstanding whatsoever.193
The German officers instructed the Byelorussian collaborators to choose a
candidate for Gottberg to consider for the leadership of the new council. A meeting to
finalize the arrangements for the creation of the BCC had been scheduled with the
Generalkommissar at noon that very day. The small group of ambitious Byelorussian
collaborators gathered hastily by the SS in the Minsk offices of the Byelorussian
Vertrauensrat could not agree amongst themselves, but they narrowed the choices to
Ostrowski, Sobolewski, or Shkelenok.194 The final decision on a candidate for the
presidency of the council was postponed until noon, when these three Byelorussian
leaders were to meet with Gottberg in order to hear the Generalkommissar read them his
final draft of the BCC charter.195 While they waited for Gottberg to arrive, the German
authorities and the Byelorussian collaborators discussed the deteriorating situation in the
region and the potential for the council. Ostrowski took the opportunity to upbraid the
Germans for not exploiting the potential of local collaboration more extensively earlier,
telling them that “their proposal had come two years late.” After complaining that closer
collaboration between the Third Reich and his cadre of Byelorussian nationalists had not
192
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come soon enough, Ostrowski quickly agreed to the German officials’ suggestions for
increased cooperation. He also made this relationship unmistakably clear to American
officials years later: “We were willing to collaborate,” Ostrowski stated plainly to
American intelligence agents in the early 1950s.196
Gottberg had been detained, and the German authorities pressed Ostrowski,
Sobolewski, and Shkelenok to suggest which one of them should assume leadership of
the council. According to Ostrowski, the others proposed his name for this post, happily
accepting the offices of the vice presidency for themselves.197 Ostrowski later depicted
this event as yet another moment in which he reluctantly shouldered the burden of
leadership against his own inclinations. He claimed that although the Germans “willingly
accepted my candidature,” he initially refused for “reasons of health.”198 Ostrowski’s
own account of events attempts to create the impression that his rival collaborators and
the German authorities practically begged him to accept the nomination. Ostrowski
wrote:
It is true that I was looking well at the time, and they said that they
only wished they had my health at my age. I advanced a further
argument, that I worked at the front all of the time…and that I
would not be able to work with the…persons in the civil
administration…. In reply to this I was promised that I would not
have to have anything to do with the [civilian administration] and
that I would deal exclusively with…servicemen in the
Eichergeistdienst [sic] (Gestapo Security Service).199
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Ostrowski still harbored resentment towards the representatives of the German civilian
administration for favoring Ermachenko upon his arrival in Minsk in the autumn of 1941,
and he remained unwilling to work with them. However, after establishing that the
council would operate under the auspices of the SS rather than the civilian administration,
Ostrowski agreed that “it was my duty to my people to accept this position.”200 In reality,
however, Ostrowski and his fellow collaborators were acceding to the will of the German
authorities rather than the Byelorussian people, as they claimed.
The trio finally met with Gottberg in his office late that evening, where he read
the final charter of the BCC to its newly appointed leaders. Although the statutes of the
charter explicitly stated that the council’s primary purpose was the mobilization of the
Byelorussian population in order to assist the German war effort against the Soviet
Union, Ostrowski asserted that after Gottberg had “read aloud to us the [BCC] statutes....I
again brought up the question of Belorussian armed forces and he agreed to my
demand.”201 This is self-aggrandizing, however, for Gottberg and the German authorities
had only considered the creation of the council for this very purpose, and the
Byelorussian nationalists were hardly in a position to demand a thing from their German
sponsors. Gottberg saw the BCC merely as “an organ that can be used to influence the
population....especially for fighting partisan bands.”202 Although Ostrowski presented
himself as a staunch and fearless advocate of Byelorussian nationalist interests, the BCC
was simply a creation of the SS intended for the exploitation of Byelorussian nationalist
200
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sentiments in order to improve German-Byelorussian cooperation and mobilize
Byelorussian recruits for anti-partisan paramilitary forces under German command.
On the following day, December 21, 1943, improvised fanfare accompanied the
public declaration of the Byelorussian Central Council.203 Generalkommissar Gottberg
announced the creation of the council, decreed the beginning of a massive recruiting
drive for the BKA, and read the statutes of the charter to the gathered crowd. Only then
did he introduce President Ostrowski. At the time of the hastily organized declaration,
Ostrowski, Sobolewski, and Shkelenok comprised the entire membership of the BCC, but
they quickly began selecting individuals to join them.204 One of the first of the posts to be
filled was the head of the military section of the council. Ostrowski, Sobolewski, and
Shkelenok invited Francizek Kushel to join the council and to mobilize Byelorussian
forces for incorporation into the German war effort.205 Kushel had much practical
experience with this role, having recruited and organized irregular anti-partisan units for
the Germans in the summer of 1942.
Organizing the fifteen-member council and its regional representatives took the
men approximately one month. On January 22, 1944, the council held a public meeting,
which was attended by Byelorussian civilians, Orthodox clergy, and German officials.206
At this meeting, Ostrowski publicly announced the membership of the council and called
for the organization of a Byelorussian army to support the Wehrmacht in its fight against
the Red Army.207 Besides the president and the two vice presidents, the BCC consisted of
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offices such as “economy and cooperation” and “culture and enlightenment.”208 Other
members oversaw health and medicine, state building, and propaganda.209 Trusted men
were appointed to serve as the regional representatives of the council, such as Stankievich
in Baranovichi and Ragula in Navahrudak.210 From the Germans’ point of view, however,
the most important office of the newly-created council was certainly the military.
In fact, increasing the use of Byelorussian military forces was the fundamental
reason Gottberg created the BCC. As the head of the military office of the council,
Kushel wasted little time beginning the mobilization of volunteers for the expansion of
the Byelorussian Regional Defense (Belaruskaja Krajovaja Abarona, or BKA). He started
organizational work as soon as he was appointed to the council in January 1944, and
Gottberg issued an official order to the BCC to begin recruiting men for induction into
the BKA at the end of February.211 Responsibility for this recruitment drive was relegated
to the newly-created council in order to exploit the propagandistic value of a
Byelorussian governing body issuing the mobilization order for an ostensibly
autonomous Byelorussian military.212 However, even Kushel realized that any
propaganda encouraging aspirations of Byelorussian nationalism was actually “nothing
more than a political maneuver on the part of the Germans to get the support of the
Byelorussian masses.”213
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At the beginning of March, all of the arrangements had been made with the
German authorities, and Ostrowski faithfully issued the council’s official order for
mobilization according to Gottberg’s instructions.214 Under Kushel’s direction, the
registration of these auxiliary military forces proceeded through regional officers, such as
Ragula in Navahrudak and Sobolewski and Shkelenok in Minsk.215 Conceding that the
BCC had no real authority to compel men to enlist, Ostrowski later stated falsely that the
council had relied instead upon “the good will of the people” in its recruitment drive for
the BKA.216 In reality, however, Kushel’s mobilization efforts depended upon coercion
rather than good will. In order to recruit as many enlistees as possible while
simultaneously registering potential political opponents with military training, Ostrowski
officially ordered the compulsory registration of all former Polish and Red Army officers
as well as the total mobilization of Byelorussian men between twenty and thirty-six
years; noncompliant citizens and their family members were either jailed or compelled to
join at gunpoint.217 Ostrowski claimed that he and the BCC had stunned their German
sponsors with the number of men they quickly enrolled:
The Germans were very skeptical about our undertaking and when
I predicted that we could count on the enlistment of 10,000
soldiers, von Gottberg said he did not think the number would
exceed 2 to 3 thousand. What was their surprise, when within three
days 28,000 people had shown up for induction? Gen. Gottberg
congratulated me but asked where he was to find arms and
ammunition, inasmuch as he had been counting on 3,000 recruits
and had not made preparations for more than 5,000. Where was he
to get hold of uniforms? Food? It is true that the difficulties were
stupendous, but....forty battalions were organized and disposed of
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in the areas that were considered to be the most threatened by Red
partisans.218
The coercive and intimidating methods used by the BCC in their recruiting drive
produced results, but they also alienated large sections of the population from the council,
whose first decrees had been as brutal many of their German sponsors’ edicts. Kushel
also bragged about the numbers of enlistees registered by these merciless tactics,
claiming that over forty battalions were organized totaling approximately 40,000 men.219
Although the exact figures remain obscure, Kushel’s estimate appears to correctly reflect
the initial numbers of men counted at the various regional induction centers. However,
Gottberg cited the difficulty of outfitting and equipping such a large force in order to
keep some semblance of Byelorussia’s industrial productivity alive. When the
organization of the BKA was completed at the end of April 1944, more than 20,000
officers and men were divided into 34 battalions.220 A month later five of Kushel’s
Byelorussian police units were also transferred into the BKA, but “the core” of the new
military force was drawn from the volunteers of the anti-partisan Byelorussian Eskadron
organized by Ragula in the Navahrudak region.221
Despite the successful mobilization drive in March and April 1944, problems of
training and equipping the new recruits remained. Kushel himself acknowledged that
although they had registered several thousand troops, there were too few experienced
Byelorussian officers available.222 According to Kushel, the officers and regional heads
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of the BKA were either young men with little training or experience, or seasoned and
well-trained older men lacking the necessary vigor.223 Moreover, the new recruits had
only undergone brief training and possessed inadequate and insufficient arms. Initially,
the BKA’s German sponsors supplied each battalion with only one hundred used Italian
rifles, or one weapon for every five or six men.224 The German authorities only properly
armed the BKA at the end of April 1944.225
Although the BCC portrayed the BKA as the beginning of an autonomous
Byelorussian army, in reality these forces remained completely at the disposal of the
Germans. Kushel claimed that the mobilization in March and April 1944 represented “the
first instance in history when the Byelorussian people were called to form a Byelorussian
Army by Byelorussian leadership.”226 Munoz and Romanko explain that although the
battalions of the BKA developed “a strongly pronounced Byelorussian national
character,” these forces remained “entirely at the disposal of the German police.”227 The
initiative for the creation of the BKA came directly from Gottberg, and the BCC merely
executed his order to begin the recruiting drive. Moreover, the BKA remained
subservient to the German command throughout its existence.228 Organized to meet the
escalating partisan threat, few battalions ever actually saw such combat. The formations
of the BKA were mostly used for agricultural work and guard duty, and desertions
occurred on a large scale. In spite of the utter dependency of the BKA on the Germans
and the poor performance of the battalions, the propaganda value of the BKA “influenced
223
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the growth of a national consciousness in many Byelorussians even years after the end of
the war.229
The Byelorussian Central Council worked hard to convince the population of their
legitimacy and autonomy, staging specious celebrations of independence and convening a
national congress. However, even these efforts showed deference to the German
authorities. Programs for the celebrations of independence in March 1944 were printed in
German for the event’s sponsors, and so many personal invitations had to be sent to
German officials that a German-language invitation was printed on the stationary of the
president of the Byelorussian Central Council.230 In June 1944, as the Germans prepared
to retreat in the face of the advancing Red Army, approximately 1,000 hand-picked
Byelorussian collaborators met in the Minsk Opera House, under the supervision of the
SD and with “the thunder of thousands of Soviet artillery guns” echoing in the
background.231 This was the highly mythologized farce known as the Second AllByelorussian Congress, which members of the BCC would misrepresent to depict
themselves as the legitimate and democratically elected Byelorussian government-inexile after the war. Here these delegates (selected by the members of the BCC and
approved by their German sponsors) met to declare their support for the Byelorussian
Central Council and reiterate their commitment to the Third Reich in spite of the
imminent collapse of the German military in Byelorussia. The congress had been
convened with every bit of pomp and ceremony possible in the face of the deteriorating
situation in the Byelorussian capital. The Minsk Opera House had been festooned with
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bunting, and nationalist orchestral music dramatically punctuated the ceremony. The
members of the BCC delivered speeches on the great strides taken for Byelorussian
nationalism and independence under the beneficent sponsorship of the German
occupation. Although Soviet artillery could be heard as the Red Army approached Minsk,
Ostrowski and his lieutenants pontificated upon the magnificent performance of the
recently created Byelorussian military forces in their heroic struggles against Soviet
partisan forces.232
Ostrowski took full advantage of the opportunity afforded him by the convocation
of this congress. He surprised his German sponsors, telling the gathered delegates, “I
consider that the [BCC] has carried out its mission successfully, and now the future fate
of Belorussia is in your hands.”233 Before the German authorities could protest, the
congress voted unanimously to reorganize the council and to reinstate Ostrowski as its
president. A biography of Ostrowski (published from his own home and almost certainly
ghostwritten by Ostrowski himself) states, “it is not surprising that Prof. Ostrowski was
nominated for this high and important post.”234 It certainly is not surprising in the least,
considering that Ostrowski and the BCC hand-selected the delegates and his was the only
name they nominated.235 Ostrowski and the BCC used this poor imitation of democracy
to portray themselves as the justly elected government of Byelorussia. The congress
triumphantly declared that the reconstituted BCC was now “the only legal representative
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of the Belorussian people.”236 Postwar propaganda echoed the words of this resolution,
declaring that the BCC and its president represented “the only legal representative of the
Byelorussian people and their country.”237
Describing the closing of the day’s events, Ostrowski undermined all declarations
of independence that had just been issued: “At the conclusion the orchestra played the
Belorussian anthem, and of course it was decided to send a telegram to Hitler, since that
was required procedure at the time.”238 This telegram personally assured Hitler that
“…all Belarusian people and BKA military formations will unfalteringly fight alongside
the German troops against the common enemy – Bolshevism.”239 The very next day the
Red Army was beginning its advance on Minsk, and German forces began to retreat.240
The BKA did not fight “unfalteringly” as Ostrowski had pledged, but fled westward with
the retreating German forces before being reincorporated as a unit of the Waffen-SS and
deployed in France. Provisions were made by the SD for the evacuation of the council
members, their regional representatives, and Kushel’s auxiliary police forces. On June 29
a special train carried 800 Byelorussian collaborators and their families to Berlin, where
they continued to work for the Third Reich until its final weeks.241

In the three years of German occupation, the German authorities and the
Byelorussian nationalists had both sought to exploit one another for their own ends. The
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collaborators had cooperated closely and eagerly with their sponsors and had deeply
involved themselves in many of the most egregious atrocities committed during the years
of the Third Reich. While the German authorities toyed with the nationalist aspirations of
these collaborators and played them against one another, the Byelorussians seized
opportunities to further their own initiatives and ambitions. The foundation of the
Byelorussian Central Council was the culmination of this relationship, and its members
served their German sponsors well while advancing their own interests. They mobilized
thousands of recruits for incorporation into the German military apparatus and faithfully
propagandized on behalf of the Third Reich. The BCC remained in the service of the SS
even after the advancing Red Army forced the Germans to retreat from Byelorussian
territory and the dream of establishing an independent Byelorussian state after a German
victory had evaporated completely. The members of the BCC fled to Germany with their
sponsors, and they continued to operate the council in the ruins of Berlin in 1944-45 and
in the Displaced Persons camps of the postwar period. Although the goals of the
Byelorussian nationalists had often conflicted with National Socialist philosophy and
German occupation policy, they shared with the Nazis a virulent hatred of the Soviet
Union. Anti-Communist fervor in the West would soon enable the Byelorussian
collaborators to escape justice for their crimes.
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PART 4
“TO ORGANIZE A ‘CRUSADE’ AGAINST RUSSIA”:
NAZI COLLABORATORS IN THE ASHES OF EUROPE, 1944-1950
As the Red Army bombed Minsk on June 29, 1944, hundreds of Byelorussian
collaborators and their families scrambled for a place on a special train to Berlin arranged
by Sturmbannführer Sepp, chief of the city’s SD.242 After arriving in Germany, the
members of the Byelorussian Central Council competed for their hosts’ attentions. They
undertook the dissemination of Nazi propaganda and assisted in the deployment of
Byelorussian guerrilla parachutists behind the advancing Soviet lines. From the Reich
capital, Ostrowski and his colleagues tried to preserve the national character of the
Byelorussian Regional Defense (BKA) by preventing its absorption into other
multinational armed forces. However, the remnants of the BKA soon became
incorporated into the Waffen-SS. Sensing that the Third Reich was crumbling around
them, the anti-Communist leaders of the BCC sought to preserve their authority while
avoiding capture by the rapidly advancing Red Army. In the spring of 1945, the
Byelorussian units marshaled by the SS surrendered to the American military, and the
leaders of the Byelorussian Central Council disappeared from the capital of the crumbling
Reich. Attempting to distance themselves from the Nazis, the members of the BCC met
in several Displaced Persons (DP) camps in Germany after the war’s end in order to
rename their organization and declare its commitment to democratic principles of
government. Several prominent collaborators assumed positions of leadership in these DP
camps, while others found employment as translators, teachers, physicians, and
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informants. Eager to continue their struggle for independence against the Soviet Union,
the opportunistic Byelorussian Nazi collaborators sought new sponsors in their crusade
for an independent Byelorussia free from Soviet hegemony. Some Byelorussian
collaborators wanted as war criminals developed close relationships with American
intelligence operatives, and although top officials were well aware of allegations of
criminal collaboration with the Nazis leveled at these men, they continued to work with
them and helped them to immigrate to the United States. Most of the leadership of the
Byelorussian Central Council came to the US within five years after the end of the war,
as American intelligence hoped to exploit the Third Reich’s Byelorussian collaborators in
the covert struggles of the Cold War.
After evacuating Minsk in July 1944, the leaders of the BCC established
themselves in Berlin. They immediately began portraying themselves as a legitimate
government-in-exile entitled to diplomatic privileges and dignified receptions. Reflecting
the self-aggrandizing tendencies of the BCC, Sobolewski was indignant that no official
reception from the leaders of the Third Reich awaited the council members when they
disembarked from their train in July 1944, and the men were further disappointed to find
that their hotel reservations had not been made for them.243 However, the members of the
BCC soon found opulent accommodations, establishing themselves at the luxurious Hotel
Excelsior.244
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When its members had settled in the bomb-ravaged German capital, the BCC
continued its activities amid the internecine quarrels of their German sponsors. The SS
had gained paramount control of Byelorussia during the final nine months of the German
occupation, but after the retreat from Minsk, Rosenberg and the Ostministerium
reasserted their authority over Germany’s policy in eastern Europe once again. Dallin
describes how Rosenberg, “in a move designed to checkmate Himmler’s sudden intrusion
into Eastern émigré politics,” officially received Ostrowski as the recognized head of
state of the legitimate Byelorussian government-in-exile.245 In October 1944, Rosenberg
issued instructions to the BCC prioritizing several assignments for the council. The first
and most pressing task was to aid in “the struggle against Bolshevism.”246 To this end,
the BCC was instructed to marshal Byelorussian military and guerrilla forces and to
disseminate Nazi propaganda among the Byelorussian diaspora living in Germany.
Kushel, the leader of the BKA and the Byelorussian auxiliary police, estimated
that over 10,000 Byelorussian soldiers fled before the onslaught of the Soviet war
machine with the retreating German forces in June 1944.247 The German military
command reorganized the remnants of these Byelorussian forces, and as Kushel himself
attested, “those going west were reformed into the Byelorussian SS Waffen Division.”248
Sensing the need to distance themselves from their German sponsors in the last months of
the war, Ostrowski had opposed the dissolution of the BKA and its new designation as a
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more transparently “Nazi-sponsored” force.249 However, control of the Byelorussian
auxiliary forces had never been fully vested in the puppet council. Ultimately the
command of these military and police units resided with the SS, which had ordered their
creation in the first place. Ostrowski petitioned the German command to permit the
organization of a “Byelorussian legion,” but in July 1944, SS Sturmbannführer and Police
Major Hans Siegling ordered all Byelorussian auxiliary police officers and members of
the BKA to assemble outside of Warsaw, where they were reorganized into a brigade of
Schutzmannschaft with units of Ukrainian auxiliary troops.250 At the end of the month,
Heinrich Himmler transformed the newly created Schutzmannschaft Brigade Siegling
into the 30th Waffen-Grenadier Division der SS.251 The nationalist character of the BKA
no longer pervaded this unit composed of German, Byelorussian, Polish, and Ukrainian
soldiers. Kushel admitted that while the division had been placed under his nominal
leadership, “actual command” remained with Siegling and the SS.252
Siegling’s liaison officer with Kushel was Boris Ragula, the founder of the Eskadron and
the regional representative of the BCC in Navahrudak.253 Ragula was also appointed as
the commander of the Byelorussian officer’s school established by the German
authorities at the military training facilities in Grafenwöhr outside Nuremberg.254 Ragula
led the newly incorporated Waffen-SS division as they were deployed to Poland that
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summer, but waves of desertions caused the German command to order their withdrawal
to East Prussia in early August.255
While the Byelorussian Waffen-SS unit withdrew from Poland, Stanislaw
Stankievich, Vitaut Tumash, and other members of the BCC embarked on a propaganda
campaign to raise support for the foundering German war effort among the Byelorussian
diaspora living in Germany. In August 1944, Stankievich became the chief editor of a
Byelorussian periodical known as Ranitsa (“The Morning”), which an American
intelligence operative described as “a pro-Nazi, anti-Allied publication printed in
Berlin.”256 Afraid to admit his involvement with an organ of Nazi propaganda published
during the war, Stankievich later referred to it simply as “a Belorussian weekly
newspaper.”257 Tumash also found a job at this weekly paper published by Rosenberg’s
ministry. He conceded that “German intelligence may have had some influence on the
policy of the Byelorussian language anti-communist newspaper he was editing, but it was
never a direct intervention.”258 In reality, however, the paper remained under the “full
control of the German authorities” during the BCC’s years in Berlin.259 Ranitsa promoted
Byelorussian nationalism, but this was only permitted in order to mobilize recruits for
incorporation into the Waffen-SS.
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Due to their experience in anti-partisan campaigns on the eastern front, Siegling’s
SS Division was deployed against the Maquis (French resistance movement) in southern
France. This came as an “unexpected blow” to the leaders of the BCC in Berlin, who
were lobbying the Reich authorities to restore the national character of the division and
redeploy Byelorussian forces in “the struggle against Bolshevism” in the East.260
Continued desertions to the Maquis made the unit untrustworthy in battle, and in
November it was withdrawn to Germany.261 Ironically, the poor conduct of the division
soon caused the imperatives of the German command and the wishes of the BCC to
coincide. The division was officially disbanded in December, but discussions between the
SS recruiting office and the leaders of the BCC continued, eventually resulting in the
creation of the Waffen-Grenadier Brigade der SS (weissruthenien No.1) on March 9,
1945.262 The Germans agreed that the unit would be composed entirely of Byelorussian
soldiers, the language of command would be Byelorussian, and the new brigade would
only be employed on the eastern front.263 However, the BCC agreed that the unit would
remain under the ultimate control of the German authorities.264 As the war in Europe was
drawing to its final stages, the brigade was deployed, under Kushel’s command, to the
Czech border near Austria.265
In late March 1945, as the situation in Germany was deteriorating, Ostrowski met
with Kushel, Ragula, and other officers of the brigade in order to discuss surrendering to
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the forces of the Western Allies rather than the Red Army.266 Ostrowski later recalled
how, at a meeting east of Nuremberg near the Czech border, he issued “a secret order to
establish contact with the allied command.”267 Because so many of the leaders of the
BCC had been complicit in atrocities committed on Byelorussian soil, the representative
chosen to approach the American forces had to be selected carefully. The BCC elected to
send Stanislaw Hrynkievich, a young man who had spent the war in Berlin studying
medicine and representing Byelorussia in the Deutsch-Ausländischer Akademiker Verein
(German-Foreign Academic Association) of the National Socialist Students League.268
Since he had traveled no further east than Warsaw during the German occupation,
Hrynkievich was innocent of any participation in atrocities committed on Byelorussian
soil. On April 18, 1945, he approached American forces at the northeastern Bavarian
town of Hof on the Czech border, and the young Byelorussian collaborator naively
expected to avoid incarceration: “I have never served in German Army or civil service,”
Hrynkievich objected as he was arrested, “I am physician.”269
Held by the 90th detachment of the U.S. Army Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC),
Hrynkievich carefully obscured the extent of the relationship between the BCC and the
Third Reich.270 He even withheld the true name of the council, describing himself as a
“deputy” of Ostrowski, the “chief of the White Ruthenian Committee for Mutual
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Help.”271 The young doctor explained that he had been “selected by his organization to
contact the Allies to continue the fight against Communism.”272 Hrynkievich’s
interrogators wrote, “in one way or another he has always voiced his hatred of
‘Bolshevism’ and he came to the Americans in the hope of helping us ‘see’ the evils of
this ‘ism’.”273 He told CIC agents that his group “intended to organize a ‘crusade’ against
Russia from the territories occupied by the Western Powers.”274 Despite his best efforts to
disguise the BCC and its Nazi ties, Hrynkievich was “charged with being a security
threat” and was held at a prison camp near Nuremberg.275
As Ostrowski’s emissary languished in American custody, the president of the
BCC went into hiding in the British-occupied zone of Germany. Preoccupied with the
possibility of repatriation to Byelorussia to face prosecution for his collaboration with the
Third Reich, Ostrowski reconstituted the BCC under a slightly altered name: “I called a
plenary meeting…and proposed that all overt activity of the [BCC] be suspended in view
of the American policy of handing over collaborators to the Bolsheviks, and that a new
organization be formed at the same time – the Belorussian National Center. The proposal
was adopted and such a center was founded in Regensburg.”276 After the BCC “liquidated
itself,” Ostrowski settled in the small town of Höxter and busied himself establishing
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contacts with the British authorities there.277 Ostrowski’s protégé, Vitaut Tumash,
followed his former teacher into the British zone, working as a physician in the DP camps
in the employ of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA)
and the International Refugee Organization (IRO).278
Although the Americans detained Hrynkievich when he approached them to offer
the services of the BCC, surrendering to the Western Allies was still preferable to capture
by the Red Army and repatriation to Byelorussia to stand trial in a Soviet court for
collaboration with the Third Reich. In order to be intercepted by American forces, Kushel
ordered his troops to fight their way through a German SS division. The Byelorussian
Waffen-SS forces surrendered to American troops in late April 1945 in the picturesque
ski town of Zwiesel, where Kushel complained that his troops were “promptly interned as
prisoners of war.”279 Kushel claimed that he had been following the directives of an
American officer and his Waffen-SS units should not have been taken prisoner.280
Ostrowski was also upset that the Byelorussian Waffen-SS unit was taken prisoner after
its surrender, but he claimed falsely that these troops had “occupied a Rhein crossing and
opened the way to the allies. For this service our division was taken prisoner by the
Americans, and those who did not escape were later turned over to the Bolsheviks.”281
However, this assertion was a fabrication. According to Ostrowski himself, he had met
with the commanders of the 30th Waffen-Grenadier Brigade der SS (weissruthenien
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Nr.1) in Hirschau on March 25, 1945.282 Kushel and his men surrendered nearby on the
Czech border on April 28, 1945, approximately five hundred kilometers away from the
Rhine River.283 Other Byelorussian recruits still training at Grafenwöhr were captured
later by the US Third Army, and the division was reunited inside a prisoner-of-war
(POW) camp outside of Regensburg in Bavaria.284 During the war, Regensburg had been
the site of a huge German POW camp that contained Australian, English, Italian, and
Soviet prisoners.285 After the war ended in May 1945, this became the site of a large DP
camp, and the members of the 30th Waffen-Grenadier Brigade der SS were reclassified
as POWs. Francizek Kushel, the Third Reich’s Byelorussian chief of police and the
commander of the 30th Waffen-Grenadier Brigade der SS, eventually became the camp
commandant at the Regensburg and Michelsdorf DP camps.286
The BCC was comprised of highly-educated, multilingual members of the
Byelorussian intelligentsia who used their talents to thrive in the chaotic postwar camp
system. Posing as Poles in order to avoid repatriation to the USSR, the members of the
BCC reinvented themselves in these Bavarian DP camps after the war as conservative
anti-Communists staunchly in support of democratic values, whitewashing their Nazi
pasts as they competed with rival factions for Allied sponsorship. Several notorious
Byelorussian collaborators ascended to prominent positions in the UNRRA camp
network of postwar Europe. Stanislaw Stankievich, “the arch-butcher” responsible for the
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brutal massacres of thousands at Borissow in 1941, became a camp leader at the
Osterhofen camp, located between Regensburg and Passau.287 First entering the camp
system in May 1945 in Amberg, Stankievich soon found work as a teacher in the
Regensburg and nearby Michelsdorf camps.288 He primarily resided in Regensburg until
the end of 1946, when he became the commandant of the DP camp at Osterhofen.289 He
also continued his work as a propagandist in the years after the war, becoming the editorin-chief of the Byelorussian nationalist newspaper Backauseyna (“The Fatherland”).290
On October 31, 1947, the United Nations formally adopted a resolution
introduced by the delegate from the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic naming
Stankievich “as a war criminal wrongfully harbored by the United States.”291
Nevertheless, Stankievich remained in his position as the leader of the Osterhofen DP
camp until May 1950.292 When he left Osterhofen, he was neither arrested nor deported to
the Soviet Union, but instead became the “Language Training Supervisor” for the
International Refugee Organization (IRO) in Munich.293 Stankievich applied for a visa to
the United States under his own name, and although the US Displaced Persons
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Committee (DPC) was ignorant of his role in the Borissow Massacre, the committee
found that Stankievich had “admitted to being the editor of a newspaper which was a
German propaganda organ. It was the opinion of the US DPC,” the report continued,
“that Stankiewicz was an out-and-out opportunist who changed his politics and allegiance
without other thought than personal gain.”294 Stankievich was considered a security risk,
and his application was rejected. He unsuccessfully appealed this decision, trying to
explain that he had only supported National Socialism against the Soviet Union because
it had been “the lesser of the two evils.”295
Other members of the BCC were more careful to obscure their identities. An
American intelligence report from 1951 concluded that “almost all of the officers of the
Byelorussian Administration used aliases at one time or another while residing in the
different allied zones of Europe immediately after the end of World War II.”296 Emanuel
Jasiuk and Juri Sobolewski, for instance, both initially lived under assumed names after
the war. Jasiuk, Stankievich’s deputy in Einsatzgruppe-B and the former burgomaster of
Kletsk, lived as “Edward Jasinski” in the French zone of occupied Germany immediately
after the war.297 After moving to the American zone in western Bavaria, Jasiuk taught
science courses at an improvised Byelorussian college.298 Although he began to use his
real name again, he continued to obscure his identity and lie about his past, deciding that
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it was in his interest to respond to the nicknames “Maj,” Mike,” or “Max” instead of
Emanuel.299
Jasiuk arrived in Stuttgart on August 24, 1948 and began to do “work of a highly
confidential nature for an American Agency.”300 This was only five days after the US
National Security Council confirmed the appointment of Office of Special Services
(OSS) veteran Frank G. Wisner to lead the newly created Office of Policy Coordination
(OPC), a nebulous department with little oversight that drew its resources from the CIA
but nominally answered to the State Department.301 The OPC was created in order to
wage a propaganda and covert action campaign against the USSR and attempt to resist
the spread of Communism. Jasiuk began working for this agency immediately after its
creation. Ostensibly, Jasiuk began working as an interviewer for the Displaced Persons
Commission under the supervision of US Vice Consul Cleveland Collier in Stuttgart.302
In reality, however, Jasiuk was an informant of Collier and his chief investigator Arendt
Wagenaar.
Wagenaar also worked for the US Army Counter Intelligence Corps and was
secretly a valuable informant for the new Office of Policy Coordination.303 Evidently,
Wagenaar’s lack of productivity in his official consular duties raised eyebrows.304 When
questioned about his activities and the identities of his informants, Wagenaar was
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reluctant to provide US officials with information. He allowed only that a “Mr. J” had
once provided “secret Russian documents” to an unidentified American intelligence
agency.305 Wagenaar refused to give Mr. J’s full name, nor would he name the
intelligence agency for which he worked.306 This Mr. J was, of course, Jasiuk. Officially,
Jasiuk was a card-carrying informant for the Air Force Counter Intelligence Unit until
July 1949.307 However, he only wore Air Force uniforms and worked for the consulate as
a cover for his work as the OPC’s pipeline into the vast reservoirs of Byelorussian Nazi
collaborators, who strove to continue their crusade against the Soviet Union in postwar
Europe. Outwardly, Jasiuk’s job was to provide the State Department and the Air Force
with intelligence on “Communist and Nazi activities” in postwar Europe.308 However, he
spent his time with the consulate connecting Wagenaar and the OPC with his fellow
Byelorussian Nazi collaborators in the DP camp network. Despite doing little real work
for the consulate, Collier later stated that he believed Jasiuk was his “second best
informant” and paid for his services directly out of his own pocket.309 Jasiuk’s contacts in
the State Department and the OPC helped him to obtain a visa of his own, and he arrived
in New York City on June 8, 1949.310
The vice president of the BCC, Juri Sobolewski, also lived under an assumed
name until settling among his compatriots in the Michelsdorf DP camp. When Allied
bombing campaigns against Berlin destroyed the Hotel Excelsior in April 1945,
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Sobolewski had been forced to evacuate the capital and flee to the southwestern German
state of Baden-Württemberg, where he remained until the end of the war in May.311
Sobolewski lived in a series of DP camps after the war under the name “Alexei
Sokolovsky” before settling at the Michelsdorf camp in 1947.312 Postwar FBI
investigations revealed that like Stankievich, Sobolewski published a paper in
Michelsdorf, “which denounced the IRO administration and Displaced Persons Camp
leaders” as Communists or communist sympathizers.313 A 1951 memorandum from the
New York office of the FBI to director J. Edgar Hoover concluded that during his time at
the Michelsdorf DP camp, Sobolewski had also penned “anonymous” and “false
denunciatory letters” to the American camp authorities about members of opposing
Byelorussian factions applying for entry to the United States.314 Sobolewski stayed at the
Michelsdorf camp until he applied for entry to the United States in 1950 and followed
Jasiuk to America.315 Upon his arrival in July 1950, agents of the Central Intelligence
Agency warned the Federal Bureau of Investigation that the Byelorussian Nazi
collaborator might “undermine patriotic Byelo-Russian groups in U.S,” but since he had
displayed “no evidence of procommunist or pro-Soviet activity,” the FBI determined that
it had “no current interest in Sobolewski.”316 Sobolewski and many other collaborators
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came to the United States in the summer of 1950, when American intelligence officials
were consumed with the outbreak of the Korean War and the spread of Communism.317
Despite their Nazi pasts, several other well-known members of the Byelorussian
Central Council successfully made their way to the United States in 1949 and 1950.
Initially deemed a “security threat” who “could cause considerable embarassment
[sic]...by his activities among the Ukrainian and [Byelorussian] DPs,” Stanislaw
Hrynkievich had been incarcerated for nineteen months after he approached American
authorities in April 1945.318 However, Hrynkievich arrived in New York City in October
1949. Jan Avdziej arrived in New York on April 4, 1950, even though the Polish
underground press had denounced him as “a murderer of innocent people,” and Polish
and Soviet radio broadcasts announced that the authorities “were seeking him as a war
criminal.”319 Francizek Kushel, the leader of the 30th Waffen-Grenadier Division der SS,
received immigration visas for himself and his wife as displaced persons in Munich on
May 18, 1950.320 They arrived in New York on June 15.321 Former mayor of Minsk
Vitaut Tumash, whose signature had appeared on the order to construct the Minsk ghetto
in 1941, departed for the United States from the Hamburg area on October 20, 1950.322
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The most notorious members of the BCC, however, did not yet immigrate to the
United States. As noted above, Stanislaw Stankievich’s first visa application to the US
was rejected.323 Instead of traveling to America, in June 1950 Stankievich went to
Edinburgh, Scotland, where he represented the Byelorussian Central Council at a
convention of the Anti-Bolshevik Block of Nations (ABN).324 Stankievich was a member
of the Central Committee of the ABN, which was secretly sponsored by the CIA.325 After
the ABN convention, Stankievich returned to Germany, where he became the chairman
of the CIA-sponsored Learned Council of the Institute for the Study of the USSR.326
Ostrowski, whose name was most frequently connected with the Byelorussian
Nazi puppet regime, fled to Argentina to escape arrest and prosecution.327 Under
President Juan Peron, Argentina had become a haven for Nazi war criminals in the years
following the war.328 Ostrowski obtained a visa from the Argentine consulate in 1950, but
before he left Europe he traveled to the United Kingdom.329 Ostrowski visited London in
the summer of 1950 in order to establish the Byelorussian Liberation Movement (BLM),
an underground guerrilla army sponsored by British intelligence designed to be
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subordinate to Ostrowski and the Byelorussian Central Council.330 However, he garnered
little support for this organization from the Byelorussian émigrés in London, and the
British commitment to the project wavered.

In the first years following the collapse of the Third Reich, the leadership of the
BCC successfully evaded capture and prosecution by Soviet authorities and successfully
established contacts with the intelligence agencies of the Western Allies. They remained
active in postwar Europe’s Displaced Persons camps, published propaganda, and
whitewashed their Nazi pasts. The members of the BCC courted new sponsors in the
tense climate of the rapidly escalating Cold War, and by 1950, many of the most
influential personalities from the Byelorussian puppet regime of the SS had immigrated
to the United States. While Ostrowski sought to organize a liberation movement with
British sponsorship, his lieutenants in the US cemented their relationships with American
operatives with the Office of Policy Coordination, the CIA, and the FBI. These American
intelligence agencies would soon become the ultimate benefactors of the Byelorussian
Nazi collaborators, harboring them in the United States and protecting them from
extradition and prosecution for their wartime crimes.
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PART 5
“IT IS UNIMPORTANT THAT WE WERE COLLABORATORS”:
BYELORUSSIAN WAR CRIMINALS IN THE UNITED STATES
The members of the Byelorussian Central Council manipulated the rising distrust
between the former Allies in the early Cold War in order to evade extradition to the
Soviet Union to face prosecution for their wartime crimes. Ostrowski, Kushel, and others
presented the remnants of their Nazi-sponsored military and espionage organizations to
western intelligence agents, exaggerating their influence and significance as valuable
“resources in the struggle against bolshevism.”331 In exchange for safe haven from
justice, the members of the BCC began working closely with multiple American
intelligence agencies. Several members of the council had already arrived in the US by
1950, and the expansion of American covert operations against the Soviet Union
provided the members of the BCC with a golden opportunity. In the early 1950s,
members of the BCC and American intelligence agents made arrangements for joint
American-Byelorussian espionage operations into the Soviet Union, and the
Byelorussians presented American agents with a quid pro quo. In exchange for their
cooperation in the covert war against the Soviet Union, they asked for assurance that their
cadre would be protected from prosecution for war crimes. The leadership of the BCC
was allowed to settle comfortably in the United States, where they formed the center of
anti-Communist espionage, propaganda, and paramilitary networks sponsored and
protected by the CIA in the name of national security. However, these networks were
infiltrated by Soviet double agents, the intelligence produced by the members of the BCC
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proved to be largely outdated or fabricated, and the paramilitary operations launched in
Soviet Byelorussia ended in disaster. Nevertheless, for decades American agents
facilitated the emigration and naturalization of these Nazi collaborators and protected
them from the threat of extradition.
The fickle loyalties and self-interest displayed by the opportunistic Byelorussians
split the leadership of the BCC in the postwar period. The members of the council eagerly
aligned themselves with whomever seemed best poised to advance their own interests at
the moment, whether the Third Reich or the United States. Many of these men worked
briefly with French and British intelligence, while others worked simultaneously for
multiple American agencies. Jasiuk, for instance, kept the FBI informed of the
developing relationship between the BCC and Frank Wisner’s Office of Policy
Coordination (OPC). Ostrowski’s notoriety as the president of the puppet regime caused
him to flee Europe for Argentina at the same time that many members of the BCC were
immigrating to the United States. While he remained absent from the centers of activity
in New York and New Jersey, Ostrowski’s influence waned, and several of his most
trusted lieutenants joined another faction of Byelorussian émigrés. Kushel, Ragula,
Stankievich, and Tumash all began working with Mikola Abramchik, Ostrowski’s chief
rival for the political leadership of the nationalist Byelorussian diaspora.332
Like many other Byelorussian collaborators, Abramchik was a member of the
intelligentsia with nationalist political beliefs and an advanced education. As a teenager,
Abramchik attended school in Minsk, where he had been an important member of the
Komsomol (Communist Youth League) before adopting anti-Soviet nationalist political
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ideals and moving to Prague, where he obtained multiple university degrees.333
Abramchik worked with German authorities during the Second World War, but briefly
and much less successfully than the members of the BCC. After the German invasion of
Poland in 1939, Abramchik went to Berlin in order to work on Ranitsa, the Byelorussian
propaganda publication sponsored by Rosenberg’s Ostministerium.334 Although
Abramchik allegedly worked secretly for the Gestapo, his German supervisors removed
him from this position due to his lack of journalistic ability and transferred him to the
Byelorussian committee in Berlin.335 This appointment did not last long either, as
Abramchik became entangled in a scandal involving the misuse of the committee’s
funds.336 He returned to Prague, where in 1943 he declared himself to be the successor to
the recently deceased president of the Byelorussian People’s Republic established by the
German army in March 1918. However, Abramchik had little support for his scheme to
revive the short-lived German-sponsored government of 1918 until after the war. His
organization became known as the Byelorussian National Rada (BNR), and Abramchik
cited his connection to the defunct Byelorussian People’s Republic to bolster his claims
to legitimacy and authority.
Although Abramchik had also worked for the Germans during the Second World
War, his position had been much more obscure than Ostrowski’s and his reputation had
not been sullied by his brief and unsuccessful association with the Third Reich. Unlike
Stankievich, he had not been denounced in the United Nations. Therefore, although he
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had little influence over the vestiges of the BCC’s military and espionage resources,
Abramchik became a more acceptable candidate to become the figurehead for the
Byelorussian anti-Communist nationalist émigré community. After the war Abramchik
found work with the intelligence agencies of multiple states. While working for French
intelligence in Paris, Abramchik was also recruited by Kim Philby, a British intelligence
officer in charge of covert operations behind the Iron Curtain.337 Philby was also a Soviet
double agent, and he eventually defected to the USSR in 1963 after having passed
Abramchik’s heavily infiltrated Byelorussian network to his American counterparts.338
Consequently, Abramchik’s CIA file reveals that he “began working for the Agency in
April 1950....as a Principal Agent Recruiter, Spotter and Adviser.”339 Philby’s identity as
a Soviet double agent may not have been revealed until he defected in 1963, but
American agents reported that Abramchik’s Byelorussian National Rada had been
“successfully and fairly deeply penetrated by Soviet and satellite agents in Europe”
before they began working with the CIA in 1950.340 Abramchik had worked as a Nazi
propagandist during the war in Berlin and led an organization infiltrated by Communist
double agents, but American intelligence officials like Wisner, Dulles, and their cadre of
hard-line anti-Communist agents in the Office of Policy Coordination and the CIA were
desperate to destabilize the USSR and roll back Soviet hegemony in eastern Europe.
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When it became clear that American intelligence was supporting Abramchik’s
BNR, several of Ostrowski’s erstwhile supporters abandoned him for his better-funded
rival. The two groups competed for the popular support of the Byelorussian nationalist
emigration as well as the financial support of the United States. Many members of the
Abramchik faction settled in New York City, while Ostrowski’s supporters in the BCC
established themselves in Passaic and South River, New Jersey.341 With Abramchik
living in Paris and Ostrowski in Argentina, the leadership of their rival factions in the
United States fell to their deputies. Juri Sobolewski immigrated to the United States in
July 1950, where he assumed the leadership of the BCC on American soil.342 However, in
1951 he informed the FBI that his advancing age limited his activities with the council,
and that he was by then only in nominal control of this organization.343
The true leader of the BCC in the United States in the 1950s was Emanuel Jasiuk,
the first prominent Byelorussian Nazi collaborator to work with American intelligence
and the first to immigrate to the US.344 Ostrowski officially designated Jasiuk as the
chairman of the BCC in the US at the end of 1949.345 He registered the organization with
the office of the Attorney General and helped fellow collaborators to come to the United
States.346 As the acting head of the BCC in the United States, Jasiuk became crucial to the
immigration and naturalization process of innumerable Byelorussian collaborators. Jasiuk
found them homes and jobs, often opening his own home to members of the BCC
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recently arrived in the US and securing work for them at his own place of employment.347
Jasiuk had found a job with the Thomas Electronics Company in Passaic, New Jersey
soon after he arrived in the US, and he arranged employment for Sobolewski and
approximately a dozen other members of his cadre when they arrived. In 1951, their
supervisor at Thomas Electronics informed the FBI that these men were “industrious,
conscientious workers” and he believed “they would all make good loyal citizens.”348
Jasiuk also worked zealously to legitimize the council, gain the support of
American politicians, and deepen the BCC’s ties with American intelligence. Convinced
that war between the US and the Soviet Union was imminent, Jasiuk brazenly forwarded
a resolution of the BCC to President Harry S. Truman and General Dwight D.
Eisenhower in November 1949, offering the United States “any aid that the organization
might be able to render even to the point of bearing arms against the USSR.”349 He also
spoke at the Ukrainian American Congress in Washington, DC at the end of 1949,
sharing a podium with future Vice-President Richard M. Nixon.350
At this time, the BCC in the US was poorly funded and weak compared to the
Abramchik faction, and so Jasiuk eagerly pursued a closer relationship with American
intelligence in order to increase the BCC’s financial support and influence among the
Byelorussian emigration. When he arrived in the United States in 1949, Jasiuk already
had extensive ties with several American intelligence offices, having worked as an
informant for Air Force intelligence and the US consulate in Stuttgart while
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simultaneously acting as a recruiter for the covert operations of the enigmatic Office of
Policy Coordination, which enjoyed a nebulous position in the American intelligence
network and had little oversight. However, these relationships had not yet permitted him
to expand the BCC’s meager budget or its limited operations; nor had it allowed Jasiuk to
be certain that he would not face extradition. In fact, when Brigadier General John
Weckerling, the chief of the army’s G-2 intelligence division, learned that Jasiuk had
immigrated to the US, he wrote to FBI director J. Edgar Hoover to inform him that Jasiuk
was wanted as a war criminal who had allegedly caused “the deaths of a number of
people in Poland” during the German occupation by compiling lists of persons to be
executed.351 Although Weckerling provided the FBI with Jasiuk’s address, agents did not
arrest or detain him. Instead, they simply questioned him about the activities and
aspirations of the BCC. Agents of the FBI’s Newark office expressed interest in
interrogating Jasiuk further about the activities of the members of the BCC in the US and
the growing operational relationship between them and the OPC, and they noted that
Jasiuk “expressed his willingness to cooperate in this matter.”352 Many meetings and
interviews followed, and Jasiuk began to work as an informant for the FBI, adding yet
another American intelligence agency to his growing list of employers.
In the course of Jasiuk’s interrogations by the FBI, it quickly became apparent
that many inconsistencies existed in his accounts of his activities during the Second
World War. Hoover took a personal interest in the case, and the director wrote that Jasiuk
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obviously “lied with respect to his activities” during the war.353 Subsequent interrogations
eventually yielded confessions from Jasiuk that he had, in fact, falsified his past to the
Displaced Persons Commission, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), the
CIA, and the FBI. Presciently anticipating that American authorities would be reluctant to
extradite any anti-Communist émigrés who could claim to be the victims of Soviet
propaganda, Jasiuk explained that he had feared persecution and almost certain death if
he were to be deported to the BSSR.354 For this reason, Jasiuk had presented several
different versions of his past over the years. The most innocent account claimed that he
had spent the entire war as a “gardener’s helper” at a Benedictine abbey in Poland.355
Jasiuk claimed that his supervisors in the Stuttgart consulate in the late 1940s, Cleveland
Collier and Arendt Wagenaar, had knowingly corroborated this false personal history as
“true and accurate.”356 Although he finally admitted to FBI agents in September 1951 that
he had served as the burgomaster in the Stolpce area during the war, he denied that this
meant he had collaborated with the Germans. He asserted instead that the BCC had been
an independent government and he had never executed the policies of the German
authorities. Confronted with the revelation that Jasiuk had falsified his personal history
and had in fact been “the Nazi mayor of Stolpce,” Collier sharply defended his trusted
informant.357 “Whether Mr. Jasiuk was ever mayor of Stolpce, I do not know,” said
Collier, “and even if he was I cannot see that it has any bearing on the case. If his estate
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was confiscated by the Russians and his family murdered by them, it does not appear to
me to be abnormal that he should not cherish particularly kindly feelings toward
them.”358 In 1951, Jasiuk admitted to FBI agents that he had lied about his Nazi past in
1945 and again in 1949 in order to avoid being deported to Byelorussia, where he feared
prosecution for his crimes as a collaborator.359 However, his new American sponsors did
not sever ties with Jasiuk once his past had come to light, and word began to spread
among the Byelorussian Nazi collaborators that the Americans neither intended to
prosecute them as war criminals nor to extradite them to Communist countries that
wished to do so.360
Meanwhile, Francizek Kushel had abandoned the Ostrowski faction and settled in
Brooklyn, serving as Abramchik’s chief representative on American soil and actively
courting the sponsorship of US intelligence. Kushel had first initiated contact with the
CIA in January 1950 while living in Munich. The former head of the Third Reich’s
Byelorussian police forces and the commander of the Byelorussian Waffen-SS brigade
petitioned the director of the anti-Communist, CIA-sponsored Voice of America radio
propaganda project to broadcast Byelorussian-language transmissions. Kushel wrote,
“Some words in this language could be heard by the White Ruthenian guerillas [sic] and
encourage them in their fighting down the Communistic opression [sic] in their native
Country.”361 Describing himself as a colonel and the leader of the Byelorussian veterans
association as well as the chairman of the Byelorussian National Committee, Kushel
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implied that he possessed a pipeline to Chorny Kot (Black Cat), a disorganized network
of underground anti-Communist guerrilla cells in the Byelorussian Soviet BSSR
described disparagingly by American intelligence agents as “a loose alliance of bandit
groups with little strength as a controlled movement.”362 CIA agents did not trust the
reliability of Kushel’s claims. They questioned the quality and strength of Kushel’s
supposed guerrilla army, and in March 1950 agents concluded that Abramchik’s entire
organization had been infiltrated by Soviet intelligence agents.363
Nevertheless, American intelligence officials desperate to undermine the Soviet
Union showed increasing interest in Kushel and Chorny Kot. While preparing to leave
Europe, Kushel traveled frequently throughout the DP camps in order to organize the
veterans of the Byelorussian SS units and the remnants of the Germans’ auxiliary police
forces. In his final months in Germany, Kushel stayed in contact with an agent of the US
Army Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC) in Regensburg through a Ukrainian liaison.364 In
1950 Abramchik arranged for Kushel to meet directly with American agents.365 A
memorandum in Kushel’s CIA file dated September 7, 1950 notes that agents did not
believe that Kushel was aware that his contact in the CIC in Germany also worked for an
enigmatic intelligence office referred to only as “Subagency 18.”366 Arendt Wagenaar,
Jasiuk’s OPC contact in the Stuttgart consulate, was not the only American agent
working for multiple agencies at cross purposes. While the CIC and the Displaced
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Persons Commission were ferreting out Nazis and war crimes suspects living in the DP
camps, the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC) was recruiting them for their covert war
on the Soviet Union. Ironically, Wagenaar worked simultaneously for both the Army CIC
and the OPC, sabotaging the former’s mission by recruiting Nazi collaborators for the
anti-Soviet covert operations of the latter.
In 1950, Kushel’s claim to have contact with an anti-Communist guerrilla
underground in Soviet Byelorussia was precisely what Frank Wisner and his agents in the
Office of Policy Coordination wanted to hear. Just four days after Kushel’s arrival in
New York in June 1950, the chief of the CIA’s Contact Division received extensive and
highly specific instructions for Kushel’s initial debriefing on the current capabilities of
Chorny Kot in the BSSR and Kushel’s control of these alleged assets.367 The results of
Kushel’s initial interrogation were promising, and agents concluded that if the reliability
of his claims could be established, Kushel might be able to provide the OPC with a
valuable intelligence pipeline into the USSR and a potential fifth column in the event of
outright war between the United States and the Soviet Union.368
Kushel eagerly exploited this opportunity to persuade the Americans to sponsor
the vestiges of the Byelorussian intelligence and military forces he had helped to create
for the Third Reich. In October 1950, Kushel brought an estimate of the military potential
of the Byelorussian diaspora to American agents.369 He also described how he had
planned and executed the illegal infiltration of two Byelorussian agents into the Soviet
367

“Memorandum of Information Concerning Franzishak Kushel, A-7 497 237, C-7 514
221,” 1; “Memorandum for Chief, Contact Division: Subject: Colonel Kushal (Kuszal),” June 19,
1950, NARA, RG 263, CIA, Kushel, Francis, E ZZ-18, B 76.
368
“Outgoing Classified Message: Central Intelligence Agency.”
369
“Confidential,” October 23, 1950, 1, NARA, RG 263, CIA, Kushel, Francis, E ZZ-18,
B 76.

98

Union in 1948. Kushel stated brazenly that further covert missions into the BSSR to
establish contact with Chorny Kot “would be of great importance for the US,” not only
for “immediate intelligence purposes,” but also “for military purposes in case of an EastWest conflict.”370 Kushel proposed to enlist and train Byelorussian expatriates for
intelligence and paramilitary operations behind the Iron Curtain in the event of war.
Agents’ initial analysis reveals that the former commander of the Byelorussian WaffenSS hinted that cooperation between these forces and American intelligence would
necessitate the immigration of many of his cadre to the United States: Kushel stated that
in his opinion, “the continental US affords the only logical security protection for such a
program.”371 Kushel’s interrogators concluded their report quite favorably, the only
“prerequisite” for working with the former Nazi collaborator raised in the document
being that “the operation should be completely under US direction” and a “close liaison”
ought to be arranged between Kushel, Abramchik, and “the proper US authorities.”372
Investigations into Kushel’s claims rapidly disproved many of his assertions about
the strength of Chorny Kot and his ability to communicate with and control these forces.
At the end of October 1950 American intelligence sources concluded that Kushel had
exaggerated the capabilities of the resistance movement. Agents of the Gehlen
Organization, the West German postwar intelligence apparatus headed by the
Wehrmacht’s former expert on the Soviet Union, Reinhard Gehlen, conducted the
interrogations of the men involved on behalf of Wisner’s Office of Policy
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Coordination.373 Historian David Cesarani explains how Gehlen had offered his “mass of
information” on the Red Army and the Soviet Union to American intelligence in
exchange for his liberty and the preservation of his “entire wartime apparatus.”374
Cesarani asserts that Wisner had been instrumental in recruiting Gehlen immediately
after the war and relied on the Gehlen Organization (codenamed “Zipper”) to provide the
OPC with its expertise on eastern and central European affairs.375 In October 1950,
Gehlen’s agents interrogated one of Kushel’s operatives and concluded that the story
about covert Byelorussian agents illegally infiltrating the BSSR in 1948 was a complete
fabrication. The interrogations revealed that Kushel, who was “intimately familiar with
immediate postwar partisan activities,” had briefed his agent before dispatching him, but
the agent remained in Poland and never crossed the Soviet border.376 Upon his return to
Germany in 1950, Kushel’s operative falsely claimed that his outdated information about
the personalities, locations, and activities of the Chorny Kot was recent news obtained
from direct contact with resistance cells in the BSSR in 1948-50. Zipper agents
concluded that Kushel’s motivation for this fabrication was political ambition, and there
could be “no doubt” that he had staged the ruse so that he could “boast of having direct
contact to partisan groups behind the Iron Curtain.”377 Gehlen’s agency concluded
definitively that “there are no really organized full fledged partisan groups” in existence
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in the BSSR, but Wisner and the OPC remained interested in exploiting the intelligence
and black ops potential of the vestiges of the Third Reich’s Byelorussian military
forces.378 Even though Kushel’s fabrication had been revealed to be false, American
intelligence operatives still eagerly continued to develop their relationship with Kushel,
Abramchik, and the BNR.
In early 1951, Abramchik proposed the creation of a joint clandestine action
group staffed by Byelorussian expatriates and sponsored by American intelligence in
order to undermine the government of the BSSR. This proposal was well timed, for
Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) Walter Bedell Smith had just appointed a
vehemently anti-Communist former OSS operative with a passion for covert operations
named Allen Welsh Dulles to oversee operations at the Central Intelligence Agency.379
Months later Dulles became deputy director of the CIA, and in February 1953 newly
sworn-in President Dwight D. Eisenhower appointed Dulles to replace Smith as Director
of Central Intelligence.380 Dulles’ influence quickly infused the agency with his
enthusiasm and his anti-Communist fervor, described by one historian of the Cold War as
“political Manichaeanism—the belief that the world is divided between good and evil.”381
Wisner also subscribed to this worldview, and these aggressively anti-Communist
American intelligence officials concluded that any questionable actions that could
undermine the USSR were completely justified, including the use of suspected war
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criminals. During the war, Dulles and Wisner had worked together in the enigmatic OSS,
and Dulles had vouched for Wisner when he was nominated as a candidate for the
leadership of the Office of Policy Coordination in 1948. The two men worked closely
together and shared their intelligence assets, but a rivalry between these agencies grew as
the expanding scope of the CIA’s covert operations infringed on the purview of the OPC.
In early 1951, however, Dulles had just arrived at the CIA and was eager to support
Abramchik’s proposal.
The architect of Abramchik’s plan for Byelorussian-American collaboration was
Boris Ragula, the former liaison between the Byelorussian and German officers of the
Byelorussian Waffen-SS unit and the leader of the Byelorussian Eskadron, the
Byelorussian cavalry unit created under the SS in autumn 1943 in Navahrudak. Ragula
began working for the United States while living in Belgium after the war. He received
regular monthly payments of 15,000 Belgian francs, which were discreetly delivered by
an American operative to his home in Louvain in exchange for his work as the primary
recruiter and principal contact for “Operation Aequor.”382 Aequor involved sponsoring
the anti-Soviet activities of Abramchik’s Byelorussian National Republic (codenamed
“Aecambista-1” or “Cambista-1”) through the publication of propaganda in Munich and
the illegal infiltration of Byelorussian agents into the BSSR in order to gather
intelligence, create networks of safehouses and local operatives, and coordinate the
activities of any remaining Chorny Kot resistance cells with their new American
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sponsors.383 Because the vast majority of the potential recruits for these covert operations
had served the Third Reich just a few years earlier, Ragula sought some assurance that
his men would be protected from prosecution for war crimes. Assurance appeared
forthcoming, for a memorandum from an unidentified American intelligence operative in
Munich in February 1951 stated that Ragula had recently been instructed to “spread
word” among his comrades that the American authorities “do not intend trying German
collaborators as war criminals.”384
Operation Aequor subsequently attracted men like Stankievich and Tumash,
whose names were well known as accused war criminals for their role in the persecution
of Byelorussia’s Jewish population.385 Tumash provided the OPC with information on
Byelorussia and the Soviet Union, and Stankievich edited the BNR’s Byelorussianlanguage propaganda newspaper published in Munich with OPC funds.386 Once enough
suitable candidates for covert operations into the BSSR had been recruited, OPC agents
rushed to find a secure training facility for their small guerrilla army. For this purpose,
agents selected a disused former SS barracks outside of Munich in the small town of
Dachau, the site of the Third Reich’s first concentration camp.387 In late September 1951
Wisner’s Office of Policy Coordination parachuted a single Byelorussian operative into
the Soviet Union and prepared to continue to infiltrate single agents occasionally as
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circumstances allowed.388 Operation Aequor’s first large-scale mission into the BSSR did
not come until late August 1952. This was just a few weeks after Director of Central
Intelligence Smith solved the growing rivalry between the OPC and the foreign
intelligence division of the CIA by merging the two offices and incorporating Wisner’s
covert action department into the CIA as the Directorate of Plans.389 Wisner’s title
changed to the Deputy Director of Plans, and his new department enjoyed a greatly
expanded budget and the personal support of Allen Dulles, the agency’s influential new
deputy director.
However, Abramchik’s group was heavily infiltrated by Soviet double agents, and
the mission was an absolute failure. A CIA report decades later revealed that after being
dropped into the BSSR “via a ‘black’ flight,” the Aequor team buried their parachutes,
made radio contact with headquarters in Germany, and hid themselves for three days
before attempting to locate contacts in Ragula’s hometown of Navahrudak.390 When they
arrived at their rendezvous point, the KGB and Soviet police and militia forces had
surrounded the area. Of the eighteen agents dispatched into the BSSR, only one survived
by becoming a double agent for the KGB.391 Although analysts in the Directorate of
Plans were not yet aware that Philby himself was a Soviet mole, it now became
inescapably clear that Abramchik’s faction had been infiltrated by double agents. The
CIA’s senior representative in Munich sent the Director of Central Intelligence a
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memorandum listing other problems with Operation Aequor, including “lack of
discipline, paucity [of] good local leaders, [and] limited screening possibilities.”392 He
therefore suggested that “no future agents” be selected from the ranks of the BNR and
recommended that the time had come to “cut CAMBISTA 1 out ops traffic.”393 The end
of the BNR’s honeymoon with the CIA provided an opportunity for Ostrowski and his
faction to win American sponsorship for their organization.
Although training continued at Dachau in anticipation of the infiltration mission
in August 1952, American confidence in the Abramchik faction was rapidly dwindling.
After the Aequor team had been ambushed, the lone surviving operative, who had been
recruited as a Soviet double agent, transmitted radio signals to American agents at
Aequor headquarters in Bavaria using “hostile control indicators” to let them know that
the security of the mission had been compromised.394 Once the fate of the Aequor team
became known, the Directorate for Plans cut its ties with the membership of the BNR in
an attempt to limit the blowback.395 Agents then began meeting extensively with
Ostrowski to ascertain if he and his group might hold the potential for more successful
collaborative efforts against the USSR.
Ostrowski had returned to Europe from Argentina in May 1952 in order to further
his relationship with British intelligence, but shortly after his arrival in West Germany he
was contacted by American agents hoping to discuss “matters of operational interest”
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with the president of the BCC.396 In September 1952, Ostrowski provided American
agents with information about his own biography, the history of the Byelorussian Central
Council, and the anti-Soviet Byelorussian diaspora throughout the world. He also brought
a highly detailed proposal for a jointly operated American-Byelorussian Intelligence
Group that would produce propaganda, provide intelligence, assume operational control
over any remnants of Chorny Kot, and prepare a guerrilla cadre to assist in the invasion
of the USSR in the event that the Cold War were to erupt in open hostilities between the
United States and the Soviet Union.397
Ostrowski claimed to possess “very fresh news from behind the Iron Curtain” due
to a network of trusted anti-Communist underground operatives who had infiltrated the
secret police forces of the Soviet Union and Poland, but he was unwilling to hand over
these alleged resources without some assurance that he and his cadre would be protected
from prosecution for war crimes. Ostrowski asked his hosts to guarantee that the
American authorities would not “send us into the cellars...and reward us with the
gallows.”398 The agents reported on the progress of these meetings with Ostrowski, and
although Director of Central Intelligence Smith noted that the president of the BCC
“appears at least opportunistic,” he registered no objections to using such a notorious
Nazi collaborator for the proposed operations or to providing the members of his cadre
with protection from prosecution.399 In his depositions for the Directorate of Plans
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concerning the history of the BCC, Ostrowski wrote, “it is unimportant that we were
collaborators during the war, and it is utterly unimportant with whom we collaborated –
Germans or devils. What is important is that we were never collaborators of Stalin and
that we have fought against him without interruption.”400 Apparently, Ostrowski’s
assumption that his past collaboration was unimportant to the CIA was correct, for
Director of Central Intelligence Smith advised his agents only that he required
“full...control of entire operation and agents [Ostrowski] may furnish.”401 There was no
doubt that Ostrowski and his faction had collaborated with the Nazis, but this did not
prevent the top leadership of the CIA from approving the use of these men for sensitive
covert operations.
The CIA also kept in contact with the leadership of the BNR in spite of grave
concerns about the security of the organization and its infiltration by Soviet agents. CIA
agents had concluded that Abramchik’s organization had been “successfully and fairly
deeply penetrated by Soviet and satellite agents in Europe” as early as March 1950,
before launching the disastrous joint operations into the BSSR.402 However, they
proceeded with the mission and continued to use the BNR’s leadership as intelligence
resources for years after determining that this organization had been infiltrated by Soviet
moles. Although American field agents warned that “caution should be exercised in
dealing with any member of this group,” operational clearance was not rescinded for the
leaders of the BNR.403 Although Kushel’s previous information concerning Chorny Kot
had been found to contain exaggerations and outright fabrications, agents believed his
400
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claims that the BNR still possessed intelligence resources that the CIA could not afford
simply to throw away. The agents conducting his interrogations wrote that if Kushel’s
claims to possess a “counter-espionage apparatus” were substantiated, “this apparatus
should be tapped by CIA.” In addition, Kushel boasted that he also associated with
accomplished scholars of the USSR who could write in English.404 His interrogators
recommended that the CIA exploit these academics for a myriad of detailed reports “in
order to enlarge our knowledge of the BSSR as well as for post-war exploitation.”405
Believing that open hostilities between the Soviet Union and the United States were
imminent, Wisner obtained Kushel’s provisional operational clearance at the end of
October 1952 and the CIA continued to utilize BNR resources.406
Foremost among the Byelorussian scholars about whom Kushel had bragged to
the CIA was Stanislaw Stankievich, the former burgomaster of Borissow and
Baranovichi, who at this time was editing Backauseyna, the OPC’s Byelorussian
propaganda organ in Munich. Upon Kushel’s recommendation, Stankievich received a
promotion to the chairmanship of the Learned Council of the Institute for the Study of the
USSR, which produced intelligence and propaganda in Munich with CIA funds between
1954-62.407 Field agents raised concerns that Stankievich was unsuitable for this position.
His wartime collaboration was well-known to Soviet intelligence and he had also

404

“Byelorussian National Rada. Source of Info: General F. Kushal,” October 20, 1952,
1, NARA, RG 263, CIA, Kushel, Francis, E ZZ-18, B 76.
405
Ibid.
406
“Secret: Security Information: Provisional Operational Clearance,” October 31, 1952,
1, NARA, RG 263, CIA, Kushel, Francis, E ZZ-18, B 76.
407
“Stankevich, Stanislaw AKA: Stankiewicz, Stanislaw; Stankiwych, Stanislaw;
Stankievic, Stanislaw.”

108

developed a reputation for “loving his liquor,” which made his discretion suspect.408 He
was allegedly overheard in his Munich offices boasting of his role in the mass murder of
the Jewish population of Borissow, and agents openly wondered whether or not it was
“advisable to have Stankievich connected with any of our activities.”409 Although agents
continued to protest that Stankievich’s excessive drinking might “result in his talking too
much,” he retained the leadership of the Institute for the Study of the USSR until an
argument with Abramchik finally led to his ouster in June 1962.410
Some agents continued to complain about the BNR’s amateur security measures
well after their supervisors had decided to continue using the compromised organization.
One agent concluded, “CAMBISTA 1’s defense mechanism against Soviet penetration is
operationally absurd...based on personal evaluation of one CAMBISTA 1 member by
another, e.g., if ‘Boris’ saw ‘Anton’ wearing an SS uniform in Minsk in 1943, ‘Anton’
must be one of the boys.”411 Yet, the relationship between the CIA and the BNR
continued despite the concerns raised by agents in the field. Operation Aequor itself was
not officially terminated until 1956, when a series of articles appearing in the Soviet
youth publication Komsomolskaya Pravda reported on the dismal fate of the Aequor team
that had parachuted into the BSSR in August 1952.412 Upon its termination, Operation
Aequor was simply replaced by a similar project designated as Operation Aeprimer,
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created to develop long-term assets within the Soviet Union from candidates suggested
by Kushel and Abramchik.413 The BNR leaders also participated in another project
named Aeready, which was launched the same year in order to train a “Hot War” cadre of
operatives to be used in the event of open hostilities.414
Despite the security risks posed by retaining the services of these unreliable Nazi
collaborators, Wisner and his cadre honored their bargain, facilitating the immigration
and naturalization of the members of the BCC and protecting them from prosecution or
extradition. Several of these men obtained US citizenship in the mid-1950s. After several
years living in the United States working with the CIA, Kushel filed his petition for
naturalization in Brooklyn on November 2, 1955.415 At the time of Kushel’s application,
the FBI recommended that INS investigators consult the CIA’s records on the former
Waffen-SS commander before they proceeded with the naturalization process.416 Due to
an unidentified “oversight,” however, Kushel’s CIA records never made it to the INS
examiner responsible for reviewing them and he was naturalized as a citizen of the
United States on December 27, 1955.417 However, INS investigators continued to look
into Kushel over the years, and in early 1963 the Confidential Records division reported
that their request for intelligence on Kushel from the CIA had been blocked: “They can
find nothing - No CIA report.”418 The following month, Richard Helms, Bissell’s
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successor as the head of the Directorate of Plans, admitted that although CIA files
actually contained “voluminous information concerning Subject...none of [it] is of a
derogatory nature.”419 Hoping to put the matter to rest, Helms enclosed a sanitized
summary of Kushel’s biography.
One month after Kushel had received his United States citizenship in December
1955, Wisner personally sent a memorandum to the commissioner of the INS replying to
a request for information on Emanuel Jasiuk, who had also filed a petition for
naturalization. Although the OPC (now the Directorate for Plans) had been using Jasiuk
as an informant and recruiter since 1948, Wisner falsely claimed that “the files...reveal no
pertinent identifiable information on Subject.”420 He suggested contacting the FBI
instead. The few files FBI agents were willing to disclose to the INS still indicated that
Jasiuk “collaborated with the German occupation forces” and provided “names of
Poles...who were later shot by the Germans.”421 Despite this incriminating information,
Jasiuk became a naturalized citizen in Hackensack, New Jersey in December 1956.422 He
was working for both the CIA and the FBI at the time he filed his naturalization petition,
but these agencies withheld many of their records containing the most damning
allegations against their informants, cast unnecessary aspersions on the sources of their
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intelligence, and disingenuously submitted sanitized biographies of the Byelorussian
collaborators to the Immigration and Naturalization Service.
Although American intelligence agencies were facilitating the immigration of
several members of the BCC, the most notorious Byelorussian Nazi collaborators did not
immigrate to the United States until the early 1960s. As other members of the BCC
received their United States citizenship, Stankievich remained in Munich working for the
CIA, accepting promotions, and burnishing his resume. Stankievich had become the
chairman of the Learned Council of the CIA-sponsored Institute for the Study of the
USSR, the vice president of the Presidium of the Scientific Council of this institute, the
head of its Byelorussian section, the editor-in-chief of multiple Byelorussian-language
propaganda publications, the president of the Byelorussian Institute of Arts and Sciences
in Munich, and Abramchik’s vice-president in the BNR.423 Stankievich first visited the
United States in March 1958 on a limited visa, but he provided a “non-existent address”
and overstayed his visa by more than a month.424 Once again, Wisner’s staff interceded
with the INS in order to facilitate the immigration process for one of their covert
operatives. In early November 1958, a letter to the district director of the INS explained
that the Directorate for Plans “required” Stankievich’s presence for their business in
Munich as well as the United States, and that the directorate consequently “would
appreciate your assistance in expediting the request for [his] re-entry permit.”425 In 1960,
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the CIA’s Munich office revealed that the Munich files contained “voluminous traces” on
Stankievich’s Nazi past and his unreliable character, but in March 1961 CIA officials
nevertheless granted approval for the “covert use” of the accused war criminal.426
Although the Soviet press continued to denounce Stankievich, his wartime crimes, and
his postwar propaganda work in Munich, the former burgomaster of Borissow and
Baranovichi traveled frequently between the United States and West Germany before
becoming a naturalized citizen of the United States in March 1969.427
As Stankievich began working for the CIA-sponsored institute in Munich and
Kushel and Jasiuk filed their naturalization petitions in the States, Ostrowski prepared to
leave West Germany for England. In 1954, Ostrowski’s record with the International
Tracing Service (ITS) was mysteriously expunged and the leader of the BCC moved to
London to live with his son.428 Although Ostrowski had originally expected to move to
the United States in the early 1950s, his notoriety had hindered his immigration until his
daughter became an American citizen in 1960. In early April 1961, the INS rapidly
approved her petition to grant her father an immigrant visa.429 In September 1961,
Richard Bissell, Frank Wisner’s successor as the Deputy Director for Plans, responded to
a request for information on Ostrowski from the director of the Office of Security at the
426
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State Department. Bissell forwarded a summary of the contents of Ostrowski’s CIA file
without including any of the most incriminating allegations. He also cast unnecessary
aspersions on the reliability of the information and dismissed any damning depositions as
fabricated slander from “Subject’s political opponents.”430 Bissell even massaged his
summary of Ostrowski’s own testimony in order to obscure the most incriminating
passages. During the review of Ostrowski’s petition for naturalization in 1971, the INS
requested all derogatory information from the FBI concerning Ostrowski’s past.
However, FBI agents merely referred the INS to the CIA.431 Receiving the request for
information on Ostrowski, the Directorate for Plans simply sent along another copy of
Bissell’s whitewashed report of October 1961.432

Active covert operations involving Byelorussian Nazi collaborators had ceased by
the time the last of the members of the BCC finally became naturalized citizens of the
United States. Nevertheless, multiple intelligence agencies continued to harbor and
protect these wanted war criminals. American intelligence officials had provided a safe
haven for the members of the BCC in exchange for fabricated intelligence reports,
paramilitary forces heavily infiltrated by Soviet double agents, and an influx of radically
right-wing, antisemitic new citizens. Knowledge of their wartime collaboration was
deliberately and repeatedly kept from INS agents, enabling the Third Reich’s
Byelorussian collaborators to settle comfortably in the United States with little fear that
430
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their pasts would ever catch up with them. Their sponsors in the CIA and the FBI
continued to protect them long after their lies and exaggerations had been exposed and
their usefulness to the United States had been exhausted. Serious investigations into the
harboring of Nazi war criminals did not begin until the mid-1970s, and intelligence
officials continued to hinder these efforts for decades until the accused had died of
natural causes. Ultimately, not a single Byelorussian Nazi collaborator who immigrated
to the United States ever faced prosecution for his crimes.
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CONCLUSION

The opportunistic collaborators of the Byelorussian Central Council had seized
every opportunity provided by the rise of the Third Reich, the German invasion of the
Soviet Union, and the German occupation of Byelorussia to advance their nationalist
aspirations and their own personal ambitions. They participated in many different aspects
of the German occupation, became complicit in atrocities, and attempted to ingratiate
themselves to their German sponsors in order to win German concessions to Byelorussian
nationalist goals and further their own careers. During the war, men such as Kushel and
Ostrowski energetically organized Byelorussian police forces, militias, and bureaucracies
to facilitate the German occupation of their homeland. Other collaborators, such as
Avdziej and Jasiuk, identified political and racial targets of Nazi ideology among the
Byelorussian civilian population who were then targeted for persecution and death. In
positions of authority, men like Tumash and Stankievich ordered the construction of
ghettos and the mass murder of the Jewish populations of the regions under their control.
Byelorussian collaborators were crucial in identifying Jews, Communists, and other
targets of the regime’s grandiose and brutal plans to recreate eastern Europe according to
National Socialist ideology. The extensive collusion of local collaborators who organized
thousands of police and anti-partisan military forces for the SS allowed the German
authorities to avoid diverting German military personnel from service on the front in
order to secure the Byelorussian territories behind the German lines.
The war against the Soviet Union ground on much longer than confident German
planners had anticipated, and the growing partisan threat, the stiffening resistance of the
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Red Army, and the German authorities’ growing need for auxiliary personnel presented
an opportunity for expanded cooperation between the Byelorussians and the SS. When
Generalkommissar Gottberg created the Byelorussian Central Council in December 1943
in order to mobilize Byelorussian soldiers for the flagging German war effort, its
members eagerly agreed to Gottberg’s conditions for the newly created puppet regime
and raised a paramilitary force of thousands of Byelorussian soldiers for incorporation
into the military apparatus of the Third Reich. Although the authority of the BCC relied
completely on their German sponsors and Gottberg exercised complete control over its
functions, the members of the BCC attempted to cultivate Byelorussian nationalism in the
population and portrayed themselves as an autonomous Byelorussian government. The
Byelorussian collaborators evacuated Minsk with their sponsors as the Nazi dream of an
eastern empire crumbled, fleeing first to Berlin and then into Europe’s network of
Displaced Persons camps after the end of the war. Wanted in the Soviet Union as war
criminals, they portrayed themselves as innocent refugees from Stalinism and
successfully traded the remnants of the Third Reich’s Byelorussian military and
espionage resources to American intelligence in exchange for safe haven in the United
States.
The members of the Byelorussian Central Council retired comfortably in the US,
and not one Byelorussian collaborator sponsored by American intelligence ever faced
prosecution for his crimes. They took advantage of the dichotomous worldview of
American intelligence officials at the height of the Cold War, according to which all
enemies of the Soviet Union, including Nazi war criminals, were viewed as potential
allies in the struggle against the spread of Communism. One senior CIA official
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responsible for gathering intelligence on the Soviet Union in Munich in the early 1950s
explained that the agency used “any bastard as long as he was anti-Communist” to fill the
enormous gaps in intelligence on the USSR.433 Another CIA agent concurred, stating
plainly that they used “any man who [would] help us defeat the Soviets—any man no
matter what his Nazi record was.”434 American intelligence officials overlooked the
criminal pasts of those who might be of use in their covert struggle against the Soviet
Union, no matter how closely they had collaborated with the Third Reich in the
prosecution of the war against the Allies, in the brutal pacification of their homeland, or
in the mass murder of civilian targets of the Nazi regime.
For decades, the members of the Byelorussian Central Council lived in the United
States in relative obscurity. For years, a dedicated handful of journalists, prosecutors, and
politicians attempted to draw public attention to the presence of Nazi war criminals in the
United States, but with little success. In 1979, congressional agitation finally led to the
creation of the Office of Special Investigations (OSI), dedicated to the deportation of
Nazi war criminals so that they would face justice for their crimes.435 Although OSI
prosecutors began to build cases on several Byelorussian collaborators living in the US,
none were ever brought to trial. Many of the aging members of the BCC died of natural
causes before charges could be leveled against them. Radoslaw Ostrowski, Francizek
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Kushel, and Emanuel Jasiuk all died of natural causes before the creation of the OSI.436 A
case against Stankievich was compiled by OSI prosecutor John Loftus, but the notorious
former burgomaster of Borissow died peacefully in his home in Jamaica, Queens, a mere
two weeks before charges were to be filed.437 Younger Byelorussian collaborators, such
as Vitaut Tumash and Boris Ragula, avoided prosecution as well. Ragula enjoyed a
successful career as a physician after immigrating to Canada, and Tumash published
nationalist Byelorussian historical works and ran the Slavic-language desk at the New
York Public Library.438 Loftus retired from the OSI in frustration, wrote a sensationalistic
but unsubstantiated account of his findings, and conducted an extensive media campaign
to expose the presence of these Nazi collaborators in the United States. However, the
only Byelorussian collaborator ever to face any threat from the Office of Special
Investigations was Jan Avdziej, who was permitted to relinquish his US citizenship
voluntarily in March 1984 rather than stand trial for his wartime crimes. Avdziej was
allowed to move to West Germany, where United States authorities quickly lost track of
his whereabouts.439

Although American intelligence agents quickly determined that the anti-Soviet
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Byelorussian émigré organizations they were interested in were riddled with Nazi
collaborators and Soviet double agents, top officials in multiple American agencies
approved the use of these dubious and unreliable figures. During the early Cold War, the
preoccupation with the struggle to contain the spread of Communism eclipsed concerns
about the Nazi pasts or wartime crimes of those who could be exploited in this crusade
against the Soviet Union. The members of the Byelorussian Central Council benefited
greatly from this situation. They escaped arrest and prosecution in the Soviet Union, and
for decades American officials obstructed official investigations into the presence of
these wanted war criminals in the United States. This phenomenon was not limited to
Byelorussian Nazi collaborators. On the contrary, recently declassified intelligence
documents reveal that American intelligence sponsored many other Nazi collaborators,
including groups of Ukrainian, Latvian, Lithuanian, and Russian war criminals who had
worked with the Third Reich. The story of the postwar relationships of these groups with
American intelligence has only recently emerged, and the case of the Byelorussian
Central Council is but one example of how American intelligence knowingly sponsored
Nazi collaborators in the Cold War. The full story of these events still remains to be told.
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